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This study compares nonprofit, government, and
forprofit hospitals in South Florida.
arrangement is defined as
the forprafit

rights to

Property rights
re~idual

profits in

hospitals, and the tax-exemption status

on the part of nonprofit and government hospitals with
obligations to serve charitable purposes in the public
interest.

This dissertation derives and tests

implications about differences in behavior in the
context of efficiency, equity, and quality of care
delivered in nonprofit, government, and forprofit
hospitals.
Fifty-six hospitals with Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals

<JCAH> accreditation were

compared on institutional variables (bed size,
location>; efficiency variables (occupancy rates,
ancillary expenses, bad debts, manhours per patient day,
salaries per FTE,

length of stay/DRG, charges/DRG,

reimbursement/ORB (on twenty DRGs>; equity variables
<Medicare days, Medicaid days, and uncompensated care>;
and finally,

the quality variable <death rates/DRS on

twenty DRGs).
The immediate effects of profit maximization is
considered as an incentive for managers in the forprofit
hospitals.

The social obligations attached to the tax-

exemption status can be argued as the underlying
rationale far output maximization,
v

i.

e.

maximizing

benefits to society by serving more patients in the
nonprofit and government hospitals.
Using analysis of variance, nonprofit, government,
and forprofit hospitals were compared to determine if
statistically significant differences were present at
the .05 level

of significance.

Pairs of hospital

types

were tested for significant differences using ANOVA,
Mann-Whitney, and multiple regression analysis.
The results provided mixed support for the property
rights theory.

Significant differences were found on

institutional variables, bed size and location;
efficiency variables, bad debts,
day,
days,

and charges per DRG;
Medicaid days,

manhours per patient

equity variables Medicare

and uncompensated care.

of the quality variable,

In terms

the death rates per DRG showed

no statistical significance.
Unexpectedly,

nonprofit hospitals were very similar

to forprofit hospitals on the variables bad debts and
Medicaid days.

The relevance of this finding to health

policy issues today,
privileges, warrant a

particularly tax-exemption
suggestion for further evaluation

of the performance of the nonprofit sector.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Property rights arrangement, hospital ownership
<nonpro~it,
di~ferences

government, and forprofit>, and possible
in behavior are factors to be explored as

the focus in the health care environment shifts to
effectiveness and cost containment.

This study examines

the behavior of nonprofit, government and

~orprofit

hospitals in the context of efficiency, equity, and
quality of services delivered.
Property rights theory posits that rights to
residual profits, as a reward for administrative
effectiveness in the forprofit hospital, provides one
underlying rationale for the
behavior.

dif~erences

in hospital

Several hypotheses will be advanced regarding

the behavior of the nonprofit, government, and forprofit
hospitals.

Forprofit hospitals are thought of as having

economic incentives to be efficient as compared to the
nonprofit and government counterpart.

By virtue of

their focus on profits, provision of care to patients in

2

the hospital setting may be less equitable (as measured
in terms

o~

number of Medicare/Medicaid days and amount

of uncompensated care).

The quality of care provided is

a function of the standards established by the state
licensing and accreditation bodies.

It is reasonable to

think along the line that hospitals, regardless of
ownership status, will attempt to meet minimum
standards.

The nonprofit and government hospital may

expand their units of service <output maximization> to
society at a level of quality that is within budget
constraints.

The farprofit hospitals will attempt to

maintain a level of quality that ensures patients will
patronize i t and that i t will attain accreditation.
The underlying premise for the output maximization
rationale for the nonprofit and government hospital is
that these hospitals do not have rights to residual
profits but do have special tax-exemption status.

As

such, these hospitals are expected to serve charitable
purposes in the public interest.
hospitals organized as nonprofit

This suggests that
(or government-owned>

will attempt to maximize benefits to society by
expanding units of service.
Today, there is emphasis on cost containment in the
provision of health care.

Hospitals are faced

with providing inpatient care according to the price
limits set under the Diagnosis Related Groupings <DRGs>

3

for all Medicare patients.

The retrospective

reimbursement system which encouraged the
overutilization of many health services is now passe.
Published work along the lines of property rights have
not examined the implications to the provision of health
care in the context of efficiency, equity, and quality.
Over the years, studies have been done to explain
differences in hospital behavior using economic models.
With the exception of Clarkson's work

(1972>, theory-

based explanation of differences is lacking.
There are five subsequent chapters which c•n be
briefly described as follows:

Chapter

II

Literature

RevieN

is in three parts.

The first part discusses some background information
regarding the heavily regulated environment hospitals
are in.

The second part presents property rights

research and economic models which explain some of the
differences in behavior of the nonprofit and forprofit
hospitals, thus providing groundwork for subsequent
relationships that are examined further in the text.
the third part, literature is presented on studies
comparing the performance of the three hospital
ownership types and provides justification for the
relevant variables pertinent to this dissertation.

Chapter

III Fra•eNork for

Analysis. The property

rights theory is used as the rationale for why

In
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differences in hospital behavior according to ownership
status might be expected.

This chapter discusses the

variables to be analyzed in the study.

It explains some

expectations regarding the behavior of nonprofit 9
forprofit, and government hospitals in the context
of efficiency, equity, and quality.

Specific hypotheses

are identified for testing.
Chapter IV Hethodology

This chapter describes the

study papulation 9 data management, and statistical
methods used for analysis.

The unit of analysis is the

hospital and the study setting is South Florida.

This

section gives information regarding the data used to
allow insight on validity and generalizability concerns.
Chapter V

Results

This chapter presents the

results of hypotheses-testing for institutional,
efficiency, equity, and quality variables.

Each area

i~

summarized and conclusions presented.
Chapter VI Conclusion

This

chapt~r

shows a

summary of the variables and pertinent findings
regarding the behavior
forprofit hospitals.
finding~

the nonprofit, government, and

The generalizability of the

is discussed in the light of the study

limitations.
cited.

a~

Recommendations for future research are

The utility of the study findings from a

practical and theoretical standpoint are discussed.
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CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This review of literature is divided into three
parts.

First is the area of health care policy which

briefly describes the trends which led to the present
changes in the health care delivery system.

This will

give an overview of the environment wherein hospitals
operate and allude to the institutional variables which
will be examined later

(geographic location, size, and

service type of hospitals).

The second part focuses on

the property rights research and economic models
relating to differences in behavior of hospitals.
and

Third

last, studies comparing nonprofit, government, and

forprofit hospitals are cited and provides justification
for relevant variables in the subsequent analysis.

H•altn Car• Palicy
From the standpoint of public policy, strategies to
assure quality of care include regulatory measures which
affect hospitals

and

licensed practicing pro+essionals

in the health care setting.

The Hill-Burton Act of

was aimed at increasing the availability and

1946

6

accessibility of facilities.
Amendments

The Social Security

(Title VI of 1965> created the Medicare and

Medicaid programs <Title XIX)

to provide for the health

care needs of the elderly and the indigent.

Title XIX

established a medical assistance program for all those
regardless of age who qualified for public assistance
and far those whose medical expenses threatened to
produce future indigency <Marmor,

1982>.

The

Comprehensive Health Manpower Training Act and the
Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1971
were attempts to increase the availability and
accessibility of manpower.
In 1972, the United States Congress attempted to
11

improve quality" through the establishment of peer

review programs.
(P.

L. 92-603>

The Social Security Amendment of 1972

created the PSROs <Professional Standards

Review Organizations).

The PSROs monitor the

appropriateness of utilization and the quality of
institutional services provided to beneficiaries of
Medicare and Medicaid programs.

The explicit objectives

of this legislation included the review of services
provided to all federal beneficiaries, to evaluate the
necessity for institutional admission, the duration of
institutional service, appropriateness of the level of
institutional care, and the adequacy and relevance
<quality>

of services provided.

7

Although the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals <JCAH) was founded in the early 1950sy i t was
not until the birth of the PSROs that emphasis on the
appraisal of health services quality would be given
greater attention.

In 1979, JCAH published its

standards on quality assurance which focused on
professional and organizational relationships.

While

PSRDs involve peer review activities resting on the
physicians, JCAH implies dual responsibility by
administrators and physicians.

Accountable to both

institutions and physicians are also members of the
nursing profession.

State licensure rules and

regulations govern practice of these professionals.
The Nurse Practice Act

<Florida Statute Section 464.003,

1979> defines what nurses are allowed to do and
specifies its scope.

Licensure renewals and

disciplinary actions are subject to these mandates.
Compliance with JCAH standards is needed by the
hospital to achieve accreditation.

The government

requires that a hospital caring for patients on Medicare
and Medicaid be accredited to be eligible for
reimbursement.

The standards for accreditation by the

JCAH include the following
(1)

(JCAH, 1987>:

the hospital maintains facilities, beds, and

services that are available over a continuous 24-hour
period, seven days a week.

8

<2>

the hospital has a median length of stay of 30

days or less <This differentiates hospitals from nursing
homes or chronic care facilities.).
(3)

the hospital provides for the following

services:
anaesthesia
diagnostic radiology
dietetic services
emergency services
infection control
medical records
medical staff
nursing services
nuclear medicine services
pathology and medical laboratory services
pharmaceutical services
plant, technology, and safety management services
professional library services
quality assurance program
respiratory care services
special care services
utilization review
These are minimum eligibility requirements for
accreditation for hospitals regardless of ownership
status.
There is a common

impression that forprofit

9
hospitals identify potential profitable markets and
build or acquire hospitals in specific geographic areas.
While this may be partly true, there are some
regulations.

One of them is Public Law 92-603,which

restricted the construction of hospital beds and
facilities under Section 1122.
Certificate of Need

State laws such as

CCON> requirements mandate prior

approval of the establishment of new health facilities
or the expansion of health services.
In Florida, the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services is responsible for reviewing
applications and giving approval.

Letters of intent

regarding health facilities and services must also be
submitted to local health councils serving the affected
area.

Thus, even the acquisition or replacement of

certain types of equipment

<i. e. CAT scanner, Nuclear

Imaging devices, Open Heart surgery facilities>

are

under the purview of the government's administrative
agencies.

Nat all states require C. 0. N.

Hospital budgets also face review.

In

approval.
Florida,

the Health Care Consumer Protection and Awareness Act
mandated that hospital budget review be reinforced with
regulatory provisions that allow the Hospital Cost
Containment Board to adjust the budgets of hospitals
whose gross revenues per adjusted admission both exceed
their peers, and the national hospital market basket

10
index.

<Market Basket Index is an estimate

o~

the

annual rate of increase in the costs of certain goods
and services used by hospitals in the production of
inpatient care.)

The items and services used in the

market basket index have been selected and weighted to
reflect the effect that general price changes have on
the hospital inpatient operating costs <HCFA, 1984>.
The hospital budget review process is done by the
Hospital Cost Containment Board

<HCCB>, which is

appointed by the Governor and consists of three
consumers, three purchasers, and three providers.

The

budget review process applies to all Florida hospitals
except those owned by the state and rehabilitation
hospitals.

These government regulations have been

directed towards efficiency as measured by costs of
health care services capped by cost ceilings established
per DRG for all Medicare patients.
are not on DRG reimbursement.
for Medicaid patients

Medicaid patients

Hospitals are reimbursed

on a per diem basis with records

subject to the Professional Review Organization

<PRO>

reviews and possible approval or denial of payment.
The entire health care system faces the challenge
of balancing what is socially equitable with issues of
efficiency -- delivering needed health services with
decreasing resources.

With the growing popularity of

propective payment systems <DRG-based reimbursement,

11

pre+erred provider organizations, and health maintenance
organizations), increasing competition for fewer and
fewer government reimbursement dollars is the phenomenon
of today.

The responses o+ health care providers in the

forprofit and nonprofit sector are multi-faceted and
substantially complex.

Hospitals may look critically at

their internal operations where possibilities for costcutting may exist. They may also examine the type of
their patient population.

Additionally, hospitals may

identify the most common DRS classifications
patients fall

their

under and whether-or-not these types o+

patients require so much in resources.

Hospitals may

also examine the amounts of reimbursement dollars they
have received per DRG and may utilize such information
to their advantage in two ways:

first,

by increasing

their patient population with specific types of DRGs and
second, by recruiting more physicians who specialize in
diseases which pertain to the specific DRGs.

These

reactions are obviously directed at ensuring that
reimbursed dollars exceed 7

if nat equal, the costs of

hospital care.
The

hospital could, through its stringent

requirements,

limit medical staff privileges or revoke

them as they see fit.

In short, the medical staff may

be limited to those who share the organization's
philosophy of cost containment through patient

12
selectivity and compliance to DRG reimbursement
limitations such as length of stay of procedures
performed.
This health care scenario is important in this
analysis of nonprofit,
hospitals.

Hospital

government,

and forprofit

ownership and subsequent

differences in behavior have been observed in the past
and several
P~operty

authors have attempted to explain them.

RiQht• and Economic Theori••

A general

view of property rights is equated with

economic rights -- the right to exercise control over
material

possessions,

the means of producing

wealth~

and

the ability to enter into voluntary transactions of
exchange

<Malloy,

1986>.

sanctioned behavioral

Property rights refer to the

relations among men that arise

from the existence of things and pertain to their use.
Property rights are the expectations a person has that
his decisions about the uses of certain resources will
be effective.
upheld~

The stronger those expectations are

in one way or another

<custom,

or government punishment of violators)
the property rigths

<Alchian and Allen,

social

ostracism,

the stranger are
1969).

The

prevailing system of property rights in the community
can be

desc~ibed~

social

relations defining the position of each

individual

with

then,

~espect

as the set of economic and

to the utilization of

sca~ce

13

resources

<Furubotn and Pejovich,

microeconomic

theory

takes

givens and proceeds to
a~

scarcity,

propositions
In a

deduce

testable
<Demsetz,

1972>.

wants
~rom

and

Traditional
technology

as

these the assumption

implications

and

normative

1966).

private property system, there is

over scarce resources and their use.
right to sell or transfer control.

control

This includes the

A private property

right system requires the prior consent of "owners ..
be~ore

their property can be affected by others.

political system plays a role here in two ways:

The
~irst,

the government or court system helps to decide who
possesses what property rights and therefore who has the
power to claim control over resources;

second, property

rights so assigned are protected by the police power of
the state.
The primary function of property rights is to guide
incentives toward greater internalization of
externalities.
social
Demsetz

Every cost and benefit associated with

interdependencies is a potential externality.
(1967>

makes clear the role of property rights

in the internalization of externalities.

A law which

establishes the right of a person to his freedom would
necessitate a payment on the part of a firm or of the
taxpayer sufficient to cover such cost.
person's labor, the same holds true.

In using a

Thus the costs of

14

producing a good or service are internalized.

Ownership

which includes the right of sale, thus, is necessary for
internalization.

It is the prohibition

o~

a property

right adjustment, the prohibition or impossibility <as
in National Defense & Security, Environmental Safety Clean Air> of the establishment of ownership title that
can be exchanged which precludes the internalization of
external costs and benefits.

Th• purpa•• of th• property

righ~•

approach i• to

achieve a g•n•r•liz•tian of the •tandard th•ary of
production and •Mchang• by can•id•rinQ the
interconnect•dn••• of own•r•hlp rights, incentive•, and
For example, in nonprofit
organizations, the so-called owners or trustees do not
have the right to decide or use the organizational
wealth for personal use -- a right which is held by
stockholders of private, forprofit corporations. Thus,
wealth effects are more immediate to the stockholder
than to the owner of an enterprise without
capitalizable, saleable property rights
Clarkson

(1972>

<Alchian,

1969).

pointed out that in nonproprietary

hospitals, trustees who find i t relatively less
rewarding

(compared to proprietary stockholders> to

increase the hospital's wealth also find i t relatively
unrewarding to enforce wealth maximizing performance by
the individuals in the hospital.

Hence, managers of

15

nonproprietary hospitals will more often redistribute
their effort towards work activities that are relatively
more pleasant but have lower value to the organizations
wealth.
There are restrictions on rights to benefits of
business transactions.

Stockholders' rights to capture

profits may be restricted, as in the case of public
utilities.

The profits of public utilities are usually

regulated by the state (for example, Florida Power &
Light Co.).

Alchian

(1969)

indicated that nonprofit

enterprises differ from profit-restricted enterprises in
two respects.

In the former,

profits are not legally

restricted and there is no restriction on entry.

The

nonprofit enterprise is entitled to retain any available
economic profits, but its organizers may not capitalize
the profits into personal take-home wealth.

Thus, the

nonprofit enterprise, if profitable, manifests and
distributes net earnings via business related costs.
Their costs may appear higher, but in fact those costs
may be distribution of profit.
Changes in economic values, new advances in
technology, and new markets bring changes to property
right arrangements.

This is particularly true when the

costs of internalization increase.

Such changes are

notable behavior patterns in the hospital environment.
Clarkson

<1972>

tested differences in hospital behavior
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resulting from property right arrangements.

His central

proposition is that effective constraints facing
decision makers in proprietary hospitals differ from
those in nonproprietary hospitals producing similar
products and that observed differences in the
combination of inputs used in production are direct
consequences of differing constraints. The arrangements
in nonproprietary nonprofit enterprises are different
from those in proprietary, profit-seeking organizations
because:

(1)

certain rights or claims to benefits in

nonproprietary organizations are not transferable by
sale

as

they are in proprietary organizations, and

(2)

managers or workers in nonprofit organizations do not
have exclusive claim on residual

products (the current

flows of money and nonmoney benefits>

that is

characteristic of forprofit enterprises.

Clarkson

presented empirical findings to offer evidence of
difference in
effort,

(3)

(1) constraints,

<2> distribution of work

information used by proprietary and

nonproprietary hospital administrators, and

<4>

variability of input selection.
Presenting evidence of differences in proprietary
and non-proprietary constraints, Clarkson cited the
study of Bower and Roemer

<1963).

Choosing only

hospitals with fewer than 150 beds <45 proprietary
hospitals and 22 nonproprietary hospitals>, two

17

conclusions were reached:

<1>

that proprietary

hospitals have less explicit bylaws and

(2)

differences

in bylaws "scores .. were associated with difference& in
hospital performance.
Today~

rules

governing hospital budget

certificate of need requirements, utilization
quality of care,

practice

of

physicians

approval,
of

beds,

and hospital

practitioners are different from the 1970 era.

Health

care policies have been directed to ensure quality,
contain cost, and allow access.

In theory, a free

market system is efficient when there is perfect
competition and when there are zero transaction costs.
In general, i t is an accepted nation that government
intervention is necessary to approach this goal
<exemplified by antitrust laws which limit rights to
transfer and ensure fair competition>.

The provision of

health care services has been subject to numerous public
policies applicable to all hospitals regardless of
ownership status.

For example, specific conduct of

hospital committees must be identified in the bylaws.
These requirements are standardized by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals <JCAH>.
Minimum requirements in terms of administrators and
those who implement patient care are specified.
indepth treatment of these standards for specific
hospitals, please refer to the JCAH Manual on

[For an

18

Accreditation,

1987J.

As health care policies change,

so do hospital behavior patterns evolve.
Previous property rights research implies that the
restraint from accrual of residual profits is the
primary source of operational differences between
nonprofit and forprofit hospitals <Clarkson, 1972).
Other researchers noted that the nonprofit form may not
be the viable form of organization in today's
competitive environment
1982>.

CClark, 1980; Hoff and Shaner,

The economic incentives present in the hospital

environment today impact on operations.

Thus,

hospitals

organized as nonprofit, government, or forprofit need to
be studied and compared.

There are also economic theories or models about
the behavior of orgnizations that help provide insights
into the possible operational differences among
hospitals.

Several authors have attempted to explain

this by providing a rationale for the production of
services by nonprofit firms.
government failure;
or quantity;

(3)

(2)

These are:

<1>

inability to evaluate quality

consumer desire for control;

physician's cooperative;

(5)

<4>

<6>

for recovery of costs;

for sales maxi mi zati on;

<7>

status or security;

conspicuous production; and

(8)

as a

to enhance managerial
(9)

output maximization.
One general view is when the private sector does
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not produce certain goods or services, when the
production is less than what the society

desires, then

the government supplies such services or goods
and Musgrave,

1973).

<Musgrave

Additionally, these goods and

services supplied by the government are intended to
benefit consumers collectively rather than individually
<Samuelson,
<Dkun,

1967> and that all citizens have access

1975>.

Failures by the government rather than

failures by the private sector give rise to nonprofit
organizations

<Weisbrod,

1977>.

This is exemplified in

one sense by the fact that organizations known as
nonprofit exist must serve charitable public purposes.
The government's response to demands for public
services is made known through the society's collectivechoice mechanisms.

This implies that the presence of

nonprofit organizations is brought about when the
government's production does not meet the consumer's
demands for public or quasi-public goods and services
<Weisbrod,

1980>.

Health care is provided by nonprofit,

government, and forprofit hospitals.
A hospital that is not owned by the government may
be incorporated under state laws as not for profit or
for profit.

As a nonprofit organization, the hospital

operates under exempt status [Section 501

(a) <3>,

IRCl

providing it performs a charitable, scientific, or
educational purpose.

To maintain tax-exempt status, no
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part of the hospital·s net earnings should accrue to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
Health institutions classified as government are owned
and operated by federal, state or local governments.
Government hospitals are directly or indirectly under
the control of elected officials.

Their financial

resources for operations and capital expenditures come
from government appropriations.

Forprofit hospitals

provide services with the intent of generating profits.
These firms are accountable to their investors or
stockholders who expect a return on their investment.
The production of goods and services by nonprofit
firms can be seen in instances when the quantity of
goods or services can not be observed or when the
quality can not be accurately evaluated
Easley and O'Hara,

1983>.

<Bays,

1983;

Beyond this, consumer desire

for control has been proposed as a rationale for the
nonprofit provision of certain goods or services
Ner,

1983).

<Ben-

Here, consumers choose to establish their

own organization rather than take chances in the market
place.

An intuitive hypothesis for the nonprofit form

is that i t is a beneficient response to the problems of
consumer lack of knowledge and vulnerability
1980).

Another view,

<Hansman,

that of Pauly and Redisch

<1973>

explained the nonprofit hospital as a physicians·
cooperative where their incomes could be maximized.
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This argument, though, undermines the physician·s
fiduciary responsibilities towards the patient and
brings into mind whether medical practice,
professional/ethical responsibilities can be reconciled
with economic interests.
Karen Davis <1970) proposed that the nonprofit
hospitals have objectives such as recovery of costs, and
output, quality, and cash flow maximization.

With

recovery of cost as an objective, nonprofits would set
prices of service equal to the average cost of providing
the service.

The assumption here is that

nonprofit

organizations serve public interest and being non-profit
making, voluntary, charitable institutions, they aim
primarily to recover costs <Ingbar and Taylor,

1968).

This recovery of cost philosophy is further exemplified
in policy guidelines set forth by the American Hospital
Association on pricing of hospital services

<AHA, 1966>.

It has been recommended that charges be set high enough
to recover casts as well as cover funds necessary for
plant expansion due to improvement of services required
to keep abreast of scientific and technological
advances.

This difficulty in determining the rate of

mark-up make empirical testing of cost-pricing
difficult.

Ordinarily, one would look at patient

charges and this would be set equal to average operating
costs to test the proposition that nonprofit hospitals
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are not profit maximizers.
Baumel

<1959> argued for the sales maximization

theory of the nonprofit firm in that managers are
rewarded on the basis of firm revenues rather than
profits.

Finkler

<1983> applied this theory to both

nonprofit and forprofit hospitals.

Hospital demand is

modeled as a function of price and the number of
physicians affiliated with the hospitals.

Hospitals are

believed to maximize sales subject to breakeven and
minimum volume constraints.
the forprofit

The constraints which face

hospital include the rules, regulations,

and controls established by owners/trustees which ensure
that the hospital services produced are the maximum for
the associated inputs used.

Hospital managers have

delegated authority to work within these constraints.
Clarkson's research on constr•ints(1972>

were discussed

earlier.
In the nonprofit hospital, the owners can not accrue
profits or assign monetary benefits to themselves or the
managers.

Since there is nonsaleability of rights to

future benefits and the absence of residual claim to
income from profits, there is

lower

cost implication

for non-maximization of outputs in the nonprofit
hospital

<Alchian,

1969; DeAlesi, 1969).

Their managers

have weaker proprietary rights to future benefits and
hence direct actions to current benefits, such as plush
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office facilities and the like.
Williamson

<1981)

and security model."

introduced the "manager status

He asserted that profits permit

the firm to expand and this also provides prestige and
status to the manager.

This model predicted that the

firm will favor certain factors of production and will
produce some outputs beyond profit-maximizing levels -behavior patterns attributed to the nonprofit firm and
which implies nonefficient production.

This study is

quite similar to an earlier study by Lin
Lin

<1971).

<1971> asserted that in the classic

competitive

model, the concept of profit maximization provided an
effective assumption about the behavior of business
firms.

He argued that most hospitals are not profit-

oriented enterprises.

He advanced the conspicuous

production theory of hospital behavior.

His study

assumes that as a producer of health care,

each

hospital has a desired status and an actual status. The
hospital attempts to minimize the gap between its
desired status and its prevailing status.

It postulates

defensive behavior on the part of hospitals.

Lin argued

that hospitals can be seen with duplication,
averequipment, and overcapacity.
has been seen without

Increase in inputs

associated increase in output.

As such, net revenue and profit maximization do not
provide a satisfactory explanation because without an
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increase in output, increased input expenditures have
nat been accompanied by increased revenue.
To the contrary, output maximization is proposed to
explain the behavior of nonprofit hospitals by Long
(1964>, Klarman
and Feldstein

(1965>, Reder

(1971>.

Long

<1965>, Newhouse

(1964>

<1970),

noted that nonprofit

hospitals maximize the number of patients seen subject
to financial
Klarman

limits specified by the sponsoring agency.

<1965)

reiterated the argument that voluntary

hospitals maximize the welfare of society by serving as
many patients as possible subject to certain specified
limits on deficits.

Reder

(1965)

asserted that

hospitals tend to be run as though their objective was
to maximize the weighted number of patients treated per
time period.

Newhouse

(1970)

proposed an economic model

of nonprofit hospital as a quantity and quality
maximizer -- these were considered as elements of the
decision-maker's maximands.

There is concern for

quantity of services because the nonprofit institution
exists for a social purpose, receives donations, and tax
exemption privileges.

The element of quality is

justified in using the line of reasoning that the laws
of decision-making in the hospital rest on a board of
trustees and the medical staff.
the utilization of hospital

Feldstein

(1971)

viewed

resources in such a way that

quantity af output is maximized

<given quality>

with the
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doctor as an independent agent of the patient.
To recapitulate, explanations regarding the
differences in hospital performance include:

the

development of nonprofit hospitals as a function of the
government's inability to meet consumer demand
<Weisbrod,

1980>; as a physician's cooperative

and Redisch,

<Pauly

1973>; and nonprofit hospitals aim to

recover costs or maximize output, quality, and cash flow

<Da vi s ,

Other theorists <Baumel,

1 970 > •

1959; Finkler,

1983) provided explanations such as sales maximization;
while Alchian

(1969) and DeAlesi

(1969)

rationalized

that the nonsaleability of rights to future benefits and
the absence of residual claim to income from profits
imply

lower

cost implication for non-maximization of

outputs in the nonprofit hospital.

The conspicuous

production theory of hospital behavior was raised by Lin
<1971)

and concluded that net revenue and profit

maximization do not provide a satisfactory explanation
because without an increase in output, increased input
does not result in increased revenue.
lines as Lin, Williamson

(1981)

Along similar

explained the

nonefficient production in the nonprofit hospital using
a

.. manager status and security model ...

Klarman

<1965>, and

Reder

<1965)

Long

<1964>,

proposed the quantity

maximization model of the nonprofit hospital, while
Newhouse

<1970>

introduced quality as a maximand in the
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decision-making process. Feldstein

<1971>

considered

quality as a given in output maximization.
These economic models, thus far, do not examine the
differences in products

<health services).

economic theory, assuming a

co~etitive

In standard

model, a firm

that wants to maximize profits will produce outputs
saleable at market price to anyone willing to pay the
set price and anyone who can afford to pay.

This

implies that goods and services are distributed in
accordance with the existing income distribution.
A voluminous amount of

discussed.

literature has been

For clarity, let me point out that these can

be grouped into two.

One group is the set

o+

economic

models which relate to quantity maximization and the
other to quality maximization.

Several studies were

related to the emphasis on increasing units of service

or output.

These models, thus far,

do not consider

exogenous changes in the environment, nor are sources of
change considered.

The determination of outputs are not

clear and the pursuit of status, prestige, and security
seem to portray hospitals in less than a professional,
humanitarian way.

With Newhouse's model

<1970>, some

rational explanation was attempted with consideration of

a very important dimension of service -- quality.
problem with this model

One

is the failure to clearly

identify what quality of inputs or outputs were being
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considered.

Feldstein

<1971>

relied heavily on the

demand and supply market mechanism and attempted to
explain hospital cost inflation in this manner as well.
Pauly and Redisch

(1973>

modeled the nonprofit

institution as a physician's cooperative and suggested
that there are residual profits
physicians.

<not to trustees)

to

An implication of this would be that the

decision-making in the nonprofit hospital would be
biased to the benefit of the physician.
consequence,

As a

i t is likely that costs of care would be

higher since there is no incentive to keep costs
[Note:

d~n.

If the hospital administration decreased patient-

staff ratio, there may be operational

inefficiencies

which may not help the physician economize on his own
time.

For example,

the results of a
understaffing,

if a

laboratory is unable to process

test right away because of

the physician would have to wait longer

and would not be able to see all of the patients within
a shorter period of time.]
Using the property rights theory to explain
differences in hospital

behavior, Clarkson

(1972>

some light on the choices made by administrators.
work,

shed
This

unfortunately, can not withstand the test o+ time.

The hospitals today, nonprofit as well as forprofit,

are

in an environment where there are pressures to deliver
ca~e

at a certain level of quality.

Additionally, the
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financial constraints <through prospective payment
rather than retrospective payment> have been imposed
to ensure cost containment.
The literature cited thus far predates DRGs.
Empirical analyses tested implications for property
right arrangements in settings were cost containment
rules and reimbursement ceilings have not been in place.
To gain better insight on hospital organizational form
and its relationship to operational differences, several
studies are discussed below which describe certain
behavioral patterns by ownership type.

Although the

studies do not specifically relate differences to
property right arrangements, they do provide some bases
for the use of certain variables in the subsequent
analyses.
Compa~a~iv•

Studt••

This section deals with differences in trends of
growth, size, insurance payers, costs, and charges by
type of ownership.
Hospital Trends.

There is a growing trend in the

proliferation of forprofit hospitals
Association [AHAJ,

1985).

<American Hospital

As of 1982, the number of

proprietary hospitals constituted 14.1% of all U. S.
hospitals and 8.2'l. of all beds.

In Florida, the number

of nongovernment, nonprofit hospitals decreased from 206
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in 1982 to 84 in 1985 while the
o~ned

forprofit~

investor

hospitals increased from 48 in 1982 to 73 in 1984

<AHA 1982 and 1984>.
The expansion of

gro~ing

observed in areas of
<Mullner,

Ross~

<California,

and

Texas~

investor-owned hospitals has been

Hadley~

demand for services
1984).

and Florida)

The sun-belt area

she~

46X of

all

investor-owned hospitals

<Federation of American

Hospitals

As a percentage of non-federal,

[FAHJ~

1984>.

short-term general and other special hospitals by state,
the states of Nevada and Florida show the highest
investor-o~ned

<FAH,

1984).

hospitals, with 507. and 447. respectively
Population, per capita income, and

insurance coverage, as well as size, are factors in
investor-ownership of hospitals
and

Watt~

et. al., 1986>.

(Lewin, et. al.,

1981

Thus, i t is not surprising

that certain geographic areas are found to have
hospitals

~ith

a disproportionate number of nonprofit,

government, and forprofit hospitals.
Hospital Size.

American Hospital Association 1984

statistics show that of 252 hospitals in Florida, there
were 74 hospitals

~ith

bed capacities of less than 100,

73 hospitals with 100-199 beds, and 43 hospitals with
200-299 beds.

Ferber

(1971)

noted that there were fewer

clear distinctions between chain-operated and nonprofits except for those attributable to size.

Investor-

30
owned hospitals show selectivity in the size of
hospitals they acquire or construct, this being affected
by health planning agencies in the area of location as
well as certificate of need requirements.
The importance of bed size is underscored for the
simple reason that services offered may vary according
to size.

Dealing with the question of optimal size for

hospitals, Berry <1973)
hospitals
50.

noted that basic service

<BSH> tend to have an average size well below

The author related the increasing average bed size

to the availability of quality enhancing services
(QESH>, complex scope of services <CSSH>, and provision
of community services

<CSH>.

meaningful and worth noting.

The study results are
For BSH, the mean bed size

was 43; QESH with 93; CSSH with 231; and CSH with 450.
This study showed that there was a clear relationship
between the availability of facilities and
the capacity of hospitals to provide

A clear relationship
services and
Groner

hos~;tal

betwee.~

~~rvices

s~~cific

and

services.

the provision of specific

costs was also shown.

(1979) studied proprietary chain hospitals

and found that by virtue of their size, these hospitals
can afford to pay for and are able to assign resource
people which an individual hospital cannot afford to
do.

The proprietary chain hospitals are, therefore, able

to prepare for contingencies and take advantage of
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opportunities which may arise.
Bed size, as a

factor in the analysis a+ hospital

performance, was also noted in another study
and Katz,

1983).

<Pattison

In the study population, total assets

per available bed were 15% lower in investor-owned chain
hospitals than in voluntary institutions.

Total assets

reflected the measure of capital resources needed to
produce an inpatient year of service.

However,

it

should be painted out that with bed size, occupancy
rates vary.

Thus,

the analysis could be particularly

problematic with large scale samples with state or
nationwide variations.
Insurance Payers.
(1973)

Ruchlin, Painter, and Cannedy

reported nonprofit facilities as having a greater

proportion of their third-party payor revenues coming
from city, county, state, and federal
farprofit counterparts.

sources than their

Forprofit hospitals may

favor patients who have the ability to pay with private
insurance.

A recent study of Pattison and Katz

<1983)

[using California data 1977-1982] revealed that in a
cost-based reimbursement system, Medicare and Medicaid
programs reimburse the hospitals for
of providing care to their patients

11

reasonable costs

<including a

11

11

return

an equity .. payment to proprietary hospitals but not to
non-profit institutions>.

They found,

though,

that the

payer class of patients did not differ significantly
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according to hospital ownership category.
The literature underscores the importance of bed
size.

The payer class of patients might vary depending

on location.

Certainly, the population of

predominantly aged 65 years and over will reflect a
larger number of Medicare enrollees.
Costs and Charges.
data from 1971-1972,

Bays <1979>, using California

found that forprofit hospitals are

significantly less costly than nonprofits after
accounting for differences in case mix.

This

interpretation, though, is complicated by the systematic
overtreatment of certain case types by independent, or

It

nonchain forprofits.

is crucial to control for this

and the use of diagna•i• r•lated graup• <DRG•> has been
done in other studies.
Lewin, et. al.

(1981) studied twelve selected

diagnoses for both hospital types.

Using 1978 Medicare

cost reports for California, Texas, and Florida, fifty
matched pairs of hospitals were compared.

The findings

revealed that forprofit chain hospitals were 23 percent,
17 percent, and 13 percent

higher than the nonprofits

in price per inpatient day, price per inpatient
admission day for charge payers and price per inpatient
day for cost payer, respectively.

The in-patient

charges in investor-owned hospitals were 8 percent
higher for routine and 36 percent higher for ancillary
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services per admission.

Expenses per day were 13 percent

higher.
Pattison and

Katz

(1983>, using data supplied by

the California Health Facilities Commission in 1980,
compared the economic performance of investor-owned and
not-for-profit hospitals in California.
findings were:

(1)

The principal

during the study period,

both casts and charges were higher in forprofit than in
nonprofit hospitals
admi ssi an [247.] >;

(measured in patient days [297.] or

(2)

the forprofit chains have used

aggressive marketing and pricing strategies to generate
high rates of profitability and growth.
Some arguments against cost studies have been that
case mix differences are not accounted for.
Martin, and Shwartz

Frick,

<1985>, using 1979 data from the New

York State Office of Health

Systems Management,

compared case loads of 11 teaching and 20 nonteaching
hospitals.

grouping• <DRS•>

~c

analyz• th• •Mt•nt ta

~hich

c•••-miM

differenc•• contribute ta diff•r•nc•• in averag• caet
p•r

c:••••

their findings indicated that the case-mix

differences explain one-fourth of the higher average
cost per case in teaching hospitals.
Watt, et.

al.

(1986>

examined the differences in

the economic performance of 80 matched pairs of investorowned chain and not-for-profit hospitals in eight states
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during 1978 and 1980, and considered how their operating
strategies might affect their relative success in a more
price-conscious market [Data analysis used student's

~

test to investigate the null hypotheses.]. The findings
suggest that total charges (adjusted for case mix) and
net

~evenues

per case were bath significantly higher in

the investor-owned chain hospitals, mainly because of
highe~

cha~ges

for ancillary services. There were no

significant differences between the two groups of
hospitals in

~egard

to patient-care costs per case

(adjusted for case mix>, but the investor-owned
hospitals have significantly higher administrative
overhead casts;
profitable;

investor-owned hospitals were more

investor-owned hospitals had fewer employees

per occupied bed but paid more per employee;

investor-

owned hospitals had funded more of their capital through
debt and had significantly higher capital costs in
proportion to their operating costs; and the two groups
did not differ in patient mix, as measured by their
Medicare case-mix indexes or the proportions of their
patients covered by Medicare or Medicaid.

The authors

concluded that investor-owned chain hospitals generated
higher profits through more aggressive pricing practices
rather than operating efficiencies.
In sum, several trends in the hospital industry
have been identified.

These are the increasing number
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of forprofit hospitals, bed size as an important factor
in analyzing the differences in performance, and the
role of insurance payers in hospital behavior.

The

literature comparing costs and charges has dealt with
data before DRS-based reimbursement was put in effect
<Tefra Act was signed into law in October, 1982>.

This

meant that hospitals were reimbursed for patient care
charges according to what they bill for.

Now that the

reimbursement system has changed, i . e. with fixed
prices per DRG, a hospital may charge any amount of
money but they will be reimbursed at a set price.

Thus,

comparisons of hospitals by ownership status before the
new prospective payment system was in effect show

differences in times when hospitals did not have much
incentive to control costs of care.
The empirical evidence points to the higher charges
on the part of the forprofit hospitals.

Thus far, one

might be tempted to draw causal linkages between the
ownership status and resulting operational differences
with existing property right arrangements.
restraint on rights to residual

The

in the nonprofit sector

may account for the lower charges.

The nonprofit sector

is assumed to pursue goals other than profit, such as
charitable goals for the benefit of social good.
creates an important dimension in distinguishing
nonprofit hopitals.

Tax-exemption laws impose

This
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restrictions on the purposes

~or

which nonprofit

corporations can be organized and operated [See Section
501

(c) <3>

Internal Revenue Code.]. To understand

further the behavior of the nonprofit hospital, let us
examine related concepts such as education and research.
Education and Research.

Activities such as

education and research enhance organizational prestige
<Goss,

1970).

Costs to support such activities may come

from grants or donations -- for the nonprofit
hospital.

The conduct or support of research is

considered charitable -- for the public good.

It was

not until recently that forprofit organizations became
eligible to receive research grants from the National
Institutes of Health.

Generating funds

~or

research

purposes come from government grants or charitable
contributions both of which forprofit hospitals are not
the preferred recipients.

Additionally, there are

numerous moral, ethical, and legal concerns associated
with research activities on human subjects.

This makes

research participation on a small scale difficult.

As

mentioned earlier, most forprofit hospitals are smaller
in size and may not have substantial resources to
support a full

time research staff.

Hospitals are either teaching or non-teaching.
Affiliation with major universities make the hospital
the site for training for students of nursing, medicine,
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biochemistry, and allied health sciences.
goals

Educational

<considered charitable and furthering public

purpose) have been associated with beth government and
nonprofit hospitals.

There are several factors which

could have led to this trend.

Government hospitals and

nonprofit religious organizations were first in the
industry to establish themselves in communities.

By

virtue of their size, various specialties can be made
readily available for practitioners.

Clinical practice

requires certain types of specialties such as
opthalmology, otorhinolaryngology, gastroenterology,
pulmonary, cardiovascular, orthopedics, genito-urinary,
endocrinology, musculo-skeletal, neurology, internal
medicine, surgery, and pathology.
resources

The amount of

<physical, human, and financial>

necessary to

provide the majority, if not all of these services
obviously impact on the costs of delivering care in
these hospitals.

Hospital Data Center

(1985> statistics

showed the average number of residents and trainees per
community hospital in 1983 as follows:

state and local

government hospitals with 300-399 beds had
beds with 93/.;

48~;

400-499

and 500-599 beds with 1967. (percent

expresses that average number of residents and trainees
per hospital bed>.
It is common knowledge that forprofit hospitals
hardly participate in teaching.

In 1983, short-term
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forprofit general hospitals with medical and nursing
school a?filiations consisted of
Government= 30Xl

<AHA, 1985>.

4~

[Nonprofits

=

4o'l.;

Teaching activities are

considered costly and logically, if

the generation of

profits is the primary goal of a hospital, i t would be
difficult to substantiate carrying on an activity that
does not increase return on investment to shareholders.
Additionally, there are institutional concerns regarding
the legal implications and the potential vulnerability
of

the hospital to laNsuits in the event of malpractice

incidents (since student nurses and physicians are
unlicensed practitioners>.
The costs incurred in providing teaching
patient charges.

Jones (1985>

impact on

conducted a study in one

large university teaching hospital, comparing four DRG
categories.

The findings show significantly higher

charges for patients with faculty attending physicians
placed on a teaching service as compared to private, nonteaching patients.

Frick and others

<1985) compared

eleven teaching and twenty non-teaching hospitals using
383 original DRGs

and found that costs per case in

teaching hospitals are 60/. higher than nonteaching
hospitals.
The preceding
prope~ty

~eiterates

two points:

first,

the

right arrangement for nonprofit hospitals to

encourage and further charitable, public

pu~poses;

and
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second, forprofit hospitals will attempt to avoid
activities

<Note: Administrative decision-makers in the

forprofit hospital are accountable to
which are non-revenue producing
government subsidies for them>.

stockholders.>

<unless there are
These phenomena are

functions of the socio-political-legal-economic
arrangement today in the health care environment.
Perhaps things would have been different if the
situation were reversed -- if federal and property tax
exemptions, tax-exempt bonds for financing capital
expenditures, and charitable donations were assigned to
forprafit hospitals also.

This would make the playing

field equal and the pure analysis of hospital behavior
in the light of property rights may allow causal
linkage.
Recent changes in health care policies, though,
create new pressures for cost control and moderation in
charges -- to which both types of hospitals must adapt.
Numerous studies in the literature examined the hospital
environment before the inception of the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibiltiy Act of

1982.

So although these

studies give us insight into relevant variables which
might be considered in future studies, applicability in
today·s competitive environment is limited.
The discussion in the

~allowing

chapter focuses on

the framework for analyses of hospital behavior under
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DRGs to test implications of the property rights theory
to efficiency, equity, and quality of care.
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CHAPTER III

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
In relating the

di~ferences

of property right

arrangements to hospital ownership status, data are
examined to determine whether or not significant
differences exist among nonprofit, government, and
forprofit hospitals in the context of efficiency,
equity, and quality of care.

The schematic diagram

below illustrates the analysis:

PROPERTY RIGHTS
I

I
-------------------------------------------1
I
I
Nonprofit

Government

Forprofit

-Institutional Variables
<Service Type, Bed Size, Location>
I

Occupancy Rates
Ancillary Expense
Bad Debts
Manhours/Pt. Day
Salaries/FTE
Length of Stay/DRG
Charges/DRG
Reimbursements/DRG

I

Equity

Quality

Medicare Days
Medicaid Days
Uncomp. Care

Death
Rates/DRG
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The intent here,

is to derive and test implications

about differences in hospital behavior in the context of
efficiency, equity, and quality.

The differences in

property right arrangements are explained as:

rights to

residual profits in the forprofit hospitals, and the tax
exemption status on the part of nonprofit and government
hospitals.

This tax exemption status is tied in to the

obligation to serve charitable purposes in the public
interest.
There is reason to believe that the rights to
residual

profits in the forprofit sector might result in

greater efficiency.

The immediate effects of profit

maximization is considered an incentive for managers in
the forprofit hospital.

Thus, performance of the

forprofits compared to nonprofit and government
hospitals may be different.

The indicators of

efficiency might be reflected as:

increased occupancy

rates, decreased ancillary expenditures, decreased bad
debts, decreased manhours per patient day, higher
salaries per FTE, decreased average length

o~

stay per

DRG, increased charges per DRG, and higher
reimbursements per DRG.
The goals and social obligations attached to the
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tax-exemption status can be argued as the underlying
rationale for output maximization, i.

e. maximizing

benefits to society by serving more patients.

To

examine the behavior of hospitals in this regard, equity
variables are used.

These are the number

o~

Medicare

days, the number of Medicaid days, and the amount of
uncompensated care provided.

The nonprofit and

government hospitals are expected to have higher
Medicare and Medicaid days, as well as provide more
uncompensated care.

Let us consider some possible

interactions among these variables.
Nonprofit and government hospitals, along the lines
of output maximization, might be seen with larger bed
size, consequently these hospitals might be expected to
have higher occupancy rates, ancillary expenses, bad
debts, manhours per patient day, lower salaries per FTE,
longer lengths of stay per DRG, lower charges per DRG,
and lower reimbursements per DRG.

The expectation that

nonprofit and government hospitals should provide
services to Medicare and Medicaid patients as well as
uncompensated care might lead to increased occupancy
rates, ancillary expenses, bad debts, manhours, and
longer lengths of stay.

On the other hand, forprofit

hospitals with lower bed capacities might be observed
with lower Medicare days, Medicaid days, and
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uncompensated care which impact an occupancy rates, the
amount of ancillary expenses, and bad debts.
The quality of care delivered in nonprofit,
government, and farprofit hospitals is seen as a
function of regulatory requirements and the fiduciary
responsibility that rests on hospital decision makers.

A certain level of quality is conceptualized as similar
among hospitals regardless of ownership status since:
(1)

a standard level of care is mandated by government

agencies such as the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services;

<2>

that for purposes of this

study using death rates per DRG as an indicator

an

exceptional rise in death rates will bring
investigations and affect hospital reputation adversely;
and lastly,

(3)

the extent of services

requiresexpenditures which are under budgetary
constraints

<such as DRGs>

for all hospital types.

The following discussion will explain the
rationale and justification for the variables used in
this analysis in seeking evidence in support of the
property rights theory.

In•tituticnal Variabl••
Hospitals differ in many repects other than
ownership.

These are in terms of services offered, bed
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size and location.
Types of services.

Hospitals may o+fer specialty

services such as rehabilitation, psychiatry, general,
or pediatrics. Services

hospitals provide

may vary or

may be limited to a certain extent for reasons such as
in the case of the +orprofit hospital>:
services may be unprofitable,
require more resources

(1)

certain

<2> certain services may

(human, capital, equipment,

technology>, or certain types of resources speci+ic to
the service.

The

existence of appropriate types of

equipment and technology parallels the services offered
in a hospital

1.

e.

whether i t is a specialty hospital

(rehabilitation, psychiatry, or pediatric) or if it
offers acute or long-term care.
This analysis will focus an acute care, general
hospitals only.

Further controls for types of patients

treated are necessary.

Consequently, the top

t~enty

DRG

categories common to all hospitals in the study will be
used.

DRGs are a classification system which groups
similar types of patients together based upon diagnostic
and therapeutic characteristics.

Each DRG is intended

to imply equal resource consumption for patients
belonging to a certain category.

Numerous arguments
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have been raised by the medical and hospital community
against the validity of using the classification system
to assign payments.
One

o~

the major points raised in most empirical

analyses

o~

hospitals is severity

o~

assignments are not specific enough.
major patient data elements which

illness, that DRG
Let us analyze the

a~~ect

the DRG

assignment and provide justification for its use
1985>.

There are six of them:

Diagnosis:

(1)

<CFR,

Principal

the condition established after study to

chiefly responsible for the admission
the hospital for care.

o~

the patient to

The principal diagnosis is

utilized to identify the appropriate major diagnostic
category
(2)

<MDC>.

MDCs are organized by body systems.

Operating Room/Surgical Procedure:

decision point in DRG assignment.
procedure

di~ferentiates

is a major

An operating room

the type of resources a patient

receives and generally denotes a higher reimbursement.
Every MDC

(except no.

15 and 20)

is split into surgical

or medical groups based upon the presence or absence of
an operating room procedure.

0- 17 & 18

distinction;

0 -

69

Age:

affects 254 of

There are three major categories

467 reimbursable DRGs.
applied:

(3)

pediatric and adult age
~

70

most common age division;

0 -35 & 36 applicable only to diabetes patients;

and

DRG 294
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and 295.

Age groupings are significant in that medical

resource consumption will vary dependent upon patient
age.

<4>

Complications/Co-Morbidities are de+ined as

secondary conditions which increase the patients' length
of stay by at least 1 day in 75X of the patients.

A

separate complications/co-morbidities list has been
developed for DRG assignment in 210 of 467 DRGs.
Sex

CS>

is a determinant of DRG assignment when a specific

DRG affects only one type of sex.

(6)

Discharge Status

<expired, transferred to an acute care facility, or
leaving a hospital against medical advice> affects only
DRG assignments in MDC 5
Circulatory System>,

<Diseases and Disorders of the

15 <Newborns and Other Neonates

with Conditions Originating in the Perinatal Period), 20
<Substance Abuse and Substance Induced Organic Mental
Disorders)

and

22

<Burns).

classification is obvious.

The complexity of the

Analysis of hospital

behavior is made difficult because of differences in
outputs or products produced.

The use of the top twenty

DRGs common to all hospitals will allow a common ground
for comparison.
The types of services each hospital offers is
controlled for in this study by means of selection

(i.e.

only acute care, general hospitals will be included) and
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through analyses of the twenty diagnosis related groups
common to all hospitals for the variables length of
stay, charges per DRG, reimbursements per DRG, and death
rates per DRG.
Bed Size [BEDS -

A-tHo:

Hypothesis All.

There are no differences among nonprofit,

government, and

forpro~it

hospitals in terms of bed

size.

A-1H1:

There are differences among nonprofit,

government, and forprofit hospitals in terms of bed
size.
Selectivity in the size of the hospital has been
demonstrated in previous studies

<Ferber,

1971>.

In the

State of Florida, there are a total of 50,736 total
beds.

Of these nonprofit hospitals have 23,471,

government hospitals have 11,045, and forprofit
hospitals have 15,720 beds
Hospital Association

<1984>

<HCCB, 1984>.

American

national data for the State

of Florida showed that of 252 hospitals, there were 74
hospitals with bed capacities less than 100, 73 with 100199 beds, and 43

~ith

200-299 beds.

Of these 85

~ere

nonprofit, 57 were government, and 73 were investorowned

<acute care, general hospitals>.

The mean bed

s1ze for acute care, general hospitals in Florida is
257.

Both nonprofit and government hospitals are larger
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with mean bed capacities of 381 and 375 respectively.
In contrast,

the forprofit hospitals were significantly

smaller with mean bed size of 213 <Sorrentino,
Bed capacity variation among hospitals
differences in resource requirements.

1985).

also imply

It was made clear

on page 29 that bed size is related to differences in
facilities, services offered, hospital costs, and
resources used
Katz,

1983>.

<Ferber,

1971; Berry,

1973; Pattison and

Small hospitals will tend to use less

resources than would a large medical center.

There is

reason to suspect that forprofit hospitals may limit bed
size.

With output maximization, nonprofit and

government hospitals would expand their services and
thus have more beds

<See pages 24-26>.

Property rights

theory leads us to suspect this in regard to bed size.
Thus, bed size remains an interesting and important
institutional variable in the study of

hospital

behavior.
Location (LOC A-2Ho:

Hypothesis A2J.

There are no differences among nonprofit,

government, and forprofit hospitals in terms of
location.
A-2H1:

There are differences among nonprofit,

government, and forprofit hospitals in terms of

so
location.
Rural counties are characterized by low population
density and assumed to have shortages of both health
manpower and health service delivery systems.

The

sparse population in the rural areas might make it less
attractive to private forprofit investors to build
hospitals there.

On the other hand, one could argue

that there is less competition in these areas
compared to the urban areas>.

<as

In this case, one can

dictate the pricing system for health services and
control the market.

Another aspect

attracting enough manpower
the service.

o~

this would be

<MDs and Nurses>

to provide

A rationale for migration to these areas

has been offered in that there would be greater
opportunities for advancement because competition is
less, MDs may have lower malpractice insurance costs and
it may be easier to obtain medical staff privileges in
these hospitals.

The urban poor population in inner

cities do have problems as well.

For example, the

mortality rate for infants in urban poverty areas is 50'l.
higher than in nonpoverty areas
1979>.

<Rudov and Santangelo,

The health needs also differ because of the

prevalence of certain diseases in particular areas.
Tuberculosis is three times more prevalent in poverty
areas;

young adults and middle-aged people earning less
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than $5000
higher

pe~

~ates

year had 301.

of diabetes,

mo~e

chronic illness and 507.

hype~tension,

and visual

impairment than people in the same age cohort earning
more than $5000 and that disability is strongly
correlated with poverty.

Additionally, making informed

decisions regarding health needs for the urban poor is
unlikely.

Lack of knowledge regarding disease risk

factors and medical services offer a serious impediment
to the urban poor

<Kane, et.

al.,

1979).

It has been shown in the literature that forprofit
hospitals do not avoid counties with relatively high
poverty or nonwhite populations.
hospitals

More forprofit

<compared to nonprofit hospitals)

are located

in counties with slightly higher rates of poverty and
nonwhite populations

<Watt, et. al.,

1986).

These

differences, though, were not statistically significant.
Property rights theory would lead us to suspect that
profit-driven hospitals may select locations where there
is a profitable market for services; this study will
test for this.
The institutional variables service type, bed size,
and location have been described and the rationale for
their use specified.

In particular, the population

selection and subsequent analyses of hospitals on the
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different dependent variables using the institutional
variables as controls are explained in the methodology
section.

Efficiency Variable•
Property right arrangements and ownership status
are related to the variables identified in the context
of efficiency.
will

Controlling variables far these analyses

be discussed in the methodology section.

The

following hypotheses will be tested:
There are no differences among nonprofit,

B-Ho:

government, and forprofit hospitals on occupancy rates
CBlHoJ, ancillary expences [B2HoJ, bad debts [B3Hol,
manhours per patient day [B4Hol, salaries per FTE

[85HoJ, lengths of stay per DRG [86HoJ, charges per DRG
(B7HoJ, and reimbursements per DRG [B8HoJ.
There are differences among nonprofit,

8-Hl:

government, and farprofit hospitals on occupancy rates
[BlHlJ, ancillary expences [82H1J,

bad debts [83H1J,

manhours per patient day [84H1], salaries per FTE
[85H1J,

lengths of stay per DRG (B6H1J, charges per DRG

[87H1J, and reimbursements per ORG CB8H1J.
There are certain expectations regarding
differences in hospital behavior related to ownership
status.

One is that economic incentives in the
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forprofit hospital may be associated with efficient use
of resources.

The other is that while rights to

residuals do not exist for the nonprofit and government
hospital, there may be other reasons why there may
be nonefficient production in the nonprofit hospital
(Note pages 14-19>.
It must be clarified that contrary to its
nomenclature, nonprofit hospitals are not restricted
from earning profits.

It is the prohibition of the

right to residual by organizational members that account
for the fundamental distinction.

No individual,

including the board, can exercise

11

ownership rights .. in

the hospital's assets as shareholders.

As previously

proposed, i t is this restraint of ownership rights to
residual profits that accounts for operational
differences among nonprofit, government, and forprofit
hospitals.

As mentioned earlier, Clarkson (1972>

identified different constraints, distribution of work
effort, information use, and variable input selection
that account for differences in hospital performance.
There is reason to believe that the present regulatory
environment with changed incentives for all hospitals
regardless of ownership status will encourage the
efficient use of resources.

This will be reflected and

seen in several variables used as indicators of
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efficiency in this study.
of

At this point, the direction

these differences will not be discussed.

As we

uncover evidence in this regard, further analysis to
determine whether one hospital type is more efficient
than another
regard>

<using the variable applicable in this

will be done.

The literature cited is replete with studies that
predate DRGs.

In a regulated environment that

encourages hospitals to deliver care at a cost which
meets or does not exceed fixed reimbursement, the
scenario becomes interesting.

The reason is that

nonprofit and government hospitals may not have rights
to residual profits but the budget constraints with DRGs
may act as a pressure to limit services and
expenditures.

This means that the ability of these

hospitals to provide services can only be maximized to
the extent allowed by their budget.

The hospital

behavior is now examined in the context of efficiency by
looking at the following variables:

occupancy rates,

ancillary expenses, bad debts, manhours per patient day,
salaries per FTE, length of stay per DRG

Con twenty

DRGs>, charges per DRG <on twenty DRGs>, and
reimbursements per DRG (on twenty DRGs>.
Occupancy Rates [DCC -

Hypothesis Bll.

Occupancy
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rates reflect the number of patients occupying the
hospitals beds throughout the year.

It is the seasonal

character of hospital occupancy in Florida that make for
lower occupancy rates during the summer in some areas.
In 1984, occupancy levels in Florida declined from 73.6X
in 1983 to 73.0X in 1984.

However, this 1984 occupancy

level remains higher than 1979 occupancy levels <68.57.)
in the State

<HCCB,

1984>.

In 1985, mean occupancy

rates for acute care, general hospitals with 100 beds
and over in Florida

<N=160>

was 64 h

<Sorrentino,

1985>.

An indicator of economic performance, occupancy
rates have long been used to make projections regarding
a hospital's ability to meet break-even points,
operational

lasses, or profits.

Consequently, forprofit

hospitals would attempt to maximize their occupancy
rates to maintain a reasonable level of profitability.
The nonprofit and government hospitals would attempt to
ensure that their occupancy rates are maintained at a
level where outputs are maximized subject to budgetary
constraints.
Ancillary Expenses [ANCI -

Hypothesis B2J.

Forprofits are entitled to saleability of rights, as
well as sharing of profits made

(as incentives to

minimize expenses and gain profits>.

In the provision

of inpatient services, costs for ancillary services and
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their utilization can be allowed to reach either a break
even paint or lowered

(where professional standards of

care are met and potential threats to lawsuits or
patient safety avoided>, ensuring profits <Ancillary
Expenses used as an indicator).

Ancillary services

include diagnostic or therapeutic services performed by
specific departments as distinguished from general or
routine patient care such as room and board.

Generally,

ancillary services are those special services for which
charges are customarily made in addition to routine
charges and include services such as laboratory,
radiology, and surgical services CHCCB, 1985).
If forprofit hospitals are to gain profits, they
may

decrease use of ancillary services to minimize

costs of production.

Nonprofit and government hospitals

do not necessarily have to make profits but
reimbursement constraints limit utilization of ancillary
services to the point allowable under DRG rules.

More

importantly, budgetary constraints also limit
appropriations far certain services in the government
hospital.

The earlier discussion on the relationship of

basic services, complexity and extent of services
offered, and increasing costs per patient day

<Berry,

1973) points to the fact that the production of goods at
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a fair market value depends on expenditures incurred.
In the study cited earlier
that the

~indings

<Watt,

1986>, you will recall

suggested that total charges and net

revenues per case were higher in investor-owned chain
hospitals due to higher charges for ancillary services.
The analysis for this study does not look at ancillary
charges per case because the relevance of charges have
limited applicability when one considers a fixed-rate
prospective payment system.

in~urred

hospital for expenses
maximizing hospital,

When r·ei mbursement to a
is fixed, then a profit-

in theory, will minimize expenses

to insure profitability.

Thus, looking at overall

expenditures for ancillary services offered per hospital
over one year will allow us to see if this behavior is
true of forprofit hospitals.
Bad Debts CDEBT -

Hypothesis 83].

The payment for

health care incurred is obtained either through Medicare
for the elderly, through Medicaid for the indigents, or
through private insurance companies.

Bad debts for non-

Medicare patients is not an allowable cost under
Medicare's cost-based reimbursement rules.

If hospitals

continue to provide care that is not paid far,
costs will

have to be borne by themselves.

these

Logically,

the hospital may limit services only to those able to
pay.

Some hospitals may elect not to accept

11

Charity ..
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patients or may set quotas.

This has occurred in south

Florida where i t is alledged that some investor-owned
hospitals have dumped Medicare, Medicaid, and charity
patients an the nonprofit hospitals
Demkovich,

(Johnson,

1982 and

1982>.

The financing of health care for those who are
unable to pay depends on the resources of health care
providers.

Current reimbursement rules today reflect

the shift of responsibility far care away from the
public sector

<Government hospitals are considered

providers of health care).

Thus, there is tremendous

concern for the behavior of hospitals, particularly the
forprofits as they attempt to recover costs and generate
profits.

The amount of bad debts expressed as a

deduction

(percentage ) will be examined here to

understand hospital

revenue

behavior among nonprofit,

government, and forprofits.
Manhours Per Patient Day [HOUR -

Hypothesis B4J.

Human resources utilized in hospitals vary but because
there are limitations on practice of nurses
member of the hospital
Practice Act,

workforce>

<the largest

through the Nurse

inspection and reviews by the Department

of Health and Rehabilitative Services

<HRS>

ensure and

safeguard patient safety, and compliance with
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accreditation standards of the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals <JCAH>, hospitals are not at
a liberty to hire the cheapest and the least number of

personnel.

Forprofit hospitals have been theorized to

minimize costs to ensure profits.

It has been supposed

that there are incentives in the forprofit hospitals for
its decision-makers/managers to ensure decreased cost
because of potential rewards in the form of profit-sharing,
salary increases, or promotions.

This incentive

of

immediate wealth effects in the forprofit institution
has been pointed out in earlier literature
1969>.

<Alchian,

To the contrary, there is no immediate wealth

effect in the nonprofit hospital because of the
constraints on rights to residual

<Clarkson,

1972>.

The attempt to decrease cost is approached in terms
of manpower and salaries since the hospital
labor-intensive.

industry is

It can be argued that the forprofit

hospital will attempt to decrease cost associated with
manpower to a point where they are in compliance with
the appropriate agencies and where the quality of care
does not jeopardize patient safety.

Unusually high

death rates has been used as a broad indicator.

In this

study, Death Rates per DRG will be examined later.
The nonprofit and government hospitals may not
make profit but theoretically would have to ensure that
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costs and expenditures do not exceed revenues
1972>.

Thus, the number

o~

<Davis,

manhours per patient day in

nonprofit and government hospitals may reflect expansion
of services subject to budgetary constraints.

In

theory, we said that this expectation is a natural
extension of increasing output to maximize

bene~its

to

society.
Salaries per FTE [SAL -

Hypothesis B5J.

Since

providing health care is labor intensive, nurses and
allied health staff are necessary on a 24-hour basis,
seven days a

week.

Limiting types of services would be

an indirect way of decreasing labor requirements up to
the point where quality of care ensures patient safety
and meets accepted standards.

In this study, we control

for this by population selection, as well as statistical
controls by using bed size as a covariate in statistical
analysis.

The analyses on the top twenty DRGs compares

hospitals on similar products

<types of patients> using

charges per DRG as a measure of costs incurred by the
hospital.
The forprofit hospitals may limit total number of
employees
salaries.

<Manhaur• p•r Pati•nt Day>, but offer higher
Higher salaries may be indicative of

distribution of residual profits.

While the nonprofit
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hospital would not have similar incentives to curtail
human resources, the argument has been posed that these
hospitals· fiduciary motive is to ensure quality.
Arguably, one can say that quantity of manpower does not
necessarily mean quality.

Also, there are JCAH and HRS

standards which must be met by all hospitals regardless
of ownership status.

At a certain level, forprofit,

nonprofit, and government hospitals would provide the
quality of health services which does not reflect
negatively towards the hospital

Rate• per DRG >.

< as indicated by D•ath

It has been alluded to earlier that

there are economic incentives in the forprofit sector
such as profit-sharing or bonuses, these tied to the
property rights argument for ownership rights to
residual.

Thus, higher salaries may be used as an

indicator of distribution of profits.
In the nonprofit and government hospitals, salary
rates and position controls are subject to budget
limits.

The property rights theory would lead us to

suspect that salaries in nonprofit and government
hospitals would be lower than the forprofit hospitals
because of this constraint in budget.
Length of Stay [STAY -Hypothesis B6J, Charges
CCHARG -

Hypothesis

87]~

Reimbursements

CREIM

Hypothesis 88] on the top twenty DRGs common to all
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hospitals.

Nonprofit and government hospitals by virtue

of being larger in bed size, thus having more services
than their forprofit counterpart, may be able to offer
needed services to more patients.

Arguably, one can say

that restricting services to specific patient
populations would be a deliberate way on the part of
forprofits to ensure profitability Cthey may not offer
obstetrical or nursery services, etc.>

by offering only

those services where they could recoup costs and get the
most reimbursements.

This may indeed be plausible given

the Diagnosis Related Groupings

CDRGs>.

With the agreed upon social arrangements using an
output maximization rationale,

i t can be expected that

nonprofit and government hospitals would serve indigents
<Medicaid patients)

and the elderly

<Medicare patients>,

regardless of the type of illness and ensure that
quality of care meets accepted standards.
a

justification for their existence:

health care needs are addressed.

This has been

that certain

Additionally, purposes

which advance public interest such as education and
research have been mentioned.
i t has

In this line of thinking,

been a common perception that nonprofit and

government hospitals provide care to patients whose
illnesses are mare severe.

Therefore,

their patients
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tend to stay longer and their occupancy rates remain
high>;

that they are located in areas that are in

greatest need;

because greater demands for health care

exist they would have a greater number of beds.

As a

function of size <being larger>, they would have
sufficient numbers of patients and provide a variety of
services to allow for affiliation with university
medical or nursing schools.

It has been contended that

a patient's stay may be longer in these hospitals by
virtue of illness severity or to allow for clinical
teaching-learning process to occur for residents,
interns, and student nurses.

Thus, the average length

of stay per DRG is compared among nonprofit, government,
and forprofit hospitals.
Charges made by each hospital per DRG will be
compared.

There are problems in using charges as an

indicator of actual costs.

Many financial

analysts will

contend that charges made by hospitals do not reflect
actual costs incurred.

In the case of the forprofits,

it is assumed that their numbers are padded to recover
costs, bad debts, or uncompensated care, or to generate
profits.

If this is true, then this might be reflected

in the higher charges

pe~

DRG in the forprofit

hospitals.
Forprofit hospitals do not

~eceive

tax deductible
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donations and must pay income and property taxes.

Does

this mean that patient charges in forprofit hospitals
would be higher because these costs are passed on to the
recipients of care?

Alternatively, would patient

charges be lower in the nonprofit and government
hospitals since they receive tax exemptions,
philantropic donations and grants? In the business
world, one has to remain price

competitive

(assuming

consumers have knowledge about price differences).

It

has been posed that forprofit hospitals treat
nonprofit/government prices as the ceiling.
Therefore, all three hospital types could have similar
patient charges <per DRG).
Charges per DRG would reflect at least 30% of true
costs in the delivery of care ( Note:

This is a

commonly accepted standard in the hospital industry.>.
With DRGs, even if a hospital tried to price its
services high, reimbursements remain fixed.

Because of

the phase-in period aver three years for DRG-based
reimbursements, patient charges per ORG remains an
important variable to consider.
The amount reimbursed to the hospital 1s fixed
according to the patient's discharge diagnosis.

The

creativity by which hospitals may maneuver to generate
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revenue reflects its ability to adjust its patient
operations in the most cost-effective manner.

The

hospital which operates under DRSs could react in such a
way that patients are properly classified in DRGs that
will allow them to be reimbursed the most.

Property

rights theory will predict that forprofit hospitals will
most likely behave in this manner.
Thus, we will examine the variables indicating
efficiency:

occupancy rates, ancillary expenses, bad

debts, manhours per patient day, salaries per FTE,
length of stay per DRG, charges per DRG, and
reimbursements per DRG.

Property right arrangements and

ownership status have been related to the variables
identified in the context of efficiency.
will be tested as stated previously.

The hypotheses

As we uncover

differences, further analyses on the direction of these
differences and their significance will be done.

Equity Variabl••
Medicare [CARE -

Hypothesis ClJ, Medicaid [CAID

Hypothesis C2J, and Uncompensated Care [UNCOMHypothesis C3J.

The following hypotheses will be

tested:
C-Ho:

There are no differences among nonprofit,

government, and forprafit hospitals in the number of

66
Medicare days [ClHol, Medicaid days [C2HoJ, and
Uncompensated Care [C3Hol.
C-Hl:

There are differences among nonprofit,

government, and

~orprofit

hospitals in the number of

Medicare days [C1H1J, Medicaid days [C2H1l, and
Uncompensated Care [C3H1J.
One philosophy of health care is that i t is a
right.

Health care can be viewed in the class of basic

liberties.

John Rawls

principles of justice:

<1967> delineated two basic
<1> that each person has an

equal right to the most extensive total system of equal
basic liberties; and

<2>

that social and economic

inequities are to be arranged so that they are to the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged.

Assuming that

the availability of health services is associated with
better health, society should attempt to achieve an
equality in the distribution of health services or an
equality in physical, mental, and social well-being.
Rawls

<1971>

principles of

has alluded to the satisfaction of the two
justice in a constitutional democracy

through a government that regulates a

~ree

economy.

In

an economic orientation, the goals would be full
employment, competition, price stability, and growth
measured in terms of dollars.
same lines, will

Health policy, along the

identify what is the socially
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acceptable health status of the citizens.

In regulating

health, the government attempts to control casts while
improving quality and

ensuring access.

The assumed role of the nonprofit and government
hospital is to further public purpose (i.
of care to the society's

e.

provision

underprivileged--aged and poor

reflected in the number of Medicare and Medicaid
patients cared for).

Attached to the tax exemption

status is the necessity of fulfilling its charitable
goals.

As a consequence, nonprofit and government

hospitals are seen as output maximizers.

Property

rights theory leads us to suspect that the nonprofit and
government hospitals should have greater numbers of
Medicare and Medicaid patients as compared to forprofit
hospitals.
Uncompensated Care.

One could suppose that

nonprofit and government

hospitals noH have the

increased burden of caring for the elderly and indigent
patients

(assuming forprofits decrease production of

services to Medicare and Medicaid patients
particularly because Medicare patients are reimbursed
under DRG limitations and Medicaid patients are sicker,
requiring more resources>.

The casts of uncompensated

care in the nonprofit and government hospitals
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might be different in comparison to their forprofit
counterpart.

There may be limited care provided to

those for whom financing is nat available or by limiting
the care provided to those for

~hom

limits have been set

on reimbursement.
The hypotheses have been stated preceding the
thoughts we have regarding expected relationships of
hospital behavior, given the implications of the
property rights theory.

Possibly, nonprofit and

government hospitals are expected to provide for
Medicare and Medicaid patients.

However, because

government monies are available for these patients, i t
would be logical to suppose that forprofit hospitals
would see this as a market for certain services if
reimbursed monies meet costs with an acceptable profit
margin.

All three hospital types are subject to

HRS/JCAH certification, potential threats of malpractice
suits, and moral-ethical obligations to preserve life,
maintain health, and alleviate suffering.

All must

maintain patient safety and meet accepted standards of
patient care.

Previous literature cited alluded to the

concept of nonprofit hospitals as output maximizers
(Long,

1964; Klarman,

1965; Newhouse,

1970).

As we

examine the number of Medicare and Medicaid days in the
three types of hospitals, the percentages of bad debts
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and uncompensated care, we take special note that
further analyses may be needed upon uncovering
significant differences.

Quality of C•r•
Death Rates Per DRG [Hypothesis-D).

There is a

concern for quality of care delivered as emphasis on
generating profits and decreasing costs are made and the
role of the forprofit sector in the provision of
services.
D-lHo:

The following hypothesis will be tested:

There are no differences among nonprofit,

government, and forprofit hospitals on death rates per

DRG.
D-1H1:

There are differences among nonprofit,

government, and forprofit hospitals on death rates per

DRG.
The difficulty in this study is that various
hospitals do not necessarily offer the exact same
services.

Service differences are

further complicated

by differences in the clientele who avail

these products.

themselves of

The concepts relevant to the assessment

of the quality of in-patient care in the hospital
setting are discussed to justify the methodology
appropriate far its evaluation.
Health care evaluation is complicated by the fact
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that "quality .. is not easy to define much mere
quantified and measured.

The importance of evaluating

quality of care is repeatedly underscored when issues on
pricing, access and availability are discussed.
becomes further clouded
operationally defined.

when

It

quality is not

Issues of quality and how i t is

defined is of initial importance prior to evaluation.
Payne

<1967>

defined quality of care as that level

of excellence produced and documented in the process of
diagnosis and therapy based on the best knowledge
derived from science and the humanities, and which
results in the least morbidity and mortality rates.
Quality consists of

the

11

goodness 11 or

respect to this dimension.

11

badness" with

He cautions that there is a

multitude of possible dimensions and criteria which when
used to define quality will have a profound influence on
the approaches and methods one may employ
assessment of medical care.

DeGendt

in the

<1970) defined

quality as the degree of conformity to preset standards
and deals exlusively with patient care as contrasted to
medical care or health care.

Brook

(1973) points out

that the phrase quality of care is vague and has
numerous emotional overlays but delineated that concern
should be on those measures of health components which
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can be altered by the medical care process and are
considered indicators of quality of care.
The
Cpatient)

issue in providing care to the client
in addition to cost is quality.

Members of

the medical and nursing professions have been trained
with respect to the humanitarian ideals of providing the
best possible care without regard for cost.

With

decreasing government subsidies to health care, clearly
the health care providers are underfire to provide
e+fective care

~ith

limitations on cost.

The problem of

accountability far the actions of health care
professionals is quite vague and fragmented.
medicine and nursing practitioners
licensure laws.

Both

are subject to state

However, they do not have direct

accountability, to the public for their actions and
performance unlike our elected officials who are subject
to public scrutiny.

Hospitals, while subject to

numerous federal and state controls, also do not have
direct accountability to the public.
Assessing the quality of care given i s difficult.
Ideally i t should include a study of inputs, processes,
and outcomes in the provision of health care.
Heydebrand

(1973>

and Georgopoulos

(1962)

have studied

the relation of hospital structure to hospital
performance.

Thus,

the relation of inputs to the
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outcome.

Organizational inputs include resources --

physical, financial,

and human

allied health employees).

<physicians, nurses, and

The relationship of resource

utilization to hospital performance has been the subject
of numerous economic studies
Pauly~

of Feldstein

Redisch

<1971>,

Newhouse

<1970>,

<1973>, and

(1973).

Efficiency issues are addressed in terms of

costs incurred providing services.
effectiveness of care delivered
quality of the outcomes.
five

Berry

Hospital

is reflected in

Starfield

<1973)

the

identified

organizational variables which facilitate the

patient care

outcomes in the hospital.

personnel, facilities and equipment,
leadership consumer

politics -

planning -

These are

the arganization·s

goals -control

involvement, information, and finance.

Donabedian

(1966,

1968) notes the complexity of

evaluating the quality of medical care and that issues
such as availability of care (access and
appropriateness>;
relationship;
crucial.

prevention;

patient-physician

client and provider satisfaction are

He pointed out that quality measurement must

include structural, procedural, and outcome components.
The strengths and weaknesses of these are identified by
Griffith

(1978>.

Structural measures tend to advocate
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high quality but not guarantee it.
are highly technical and
look at the end paint;

Procedural measures

specific.

the

di~~iculty

Outcome measures
lies in relating

specific events to the outcome.
The view of hospitals as complex systems with
defined, explicit purposes comes from the social science
perspectives of Etzioni
and Perrow

(1965).

<1961), Blau and Scott

<1962>,

The relationships of various

organization structures, attributes, or goals to
determining

organizational efTectiveness, or the

quality of care have been studied in one form or another
by numerous researchers.

Shortell and Brown

(1976>

reviewed 19 comparative empirical studies of hospitals
and classified these organizational variables into six
major categories.

These are:

the environment, goals,

technology, decision-making structure, reward system,
and modes of coordination.
Moseley and Grimes

(1976>

presented an analytical

framework to measure the hospital effectiveness.
were two broad measures:
(2)

(1)

administrative measures.

There

patient care measures and
Under these were

structural, process, outcome, and attitudinal measures.
At best, outcome measures of quality of care are
the most important indicators.

Diagnostic specific

mortality and morbidity rates have been useTul in
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determining needs for specific services.

When used in

comparative studies, this is useful in determining
effectiveness of different

treatments.

While this can

be done, an important consideration is how severe an
illness suffered is and how the quality of life is
discharge, if death did not occur.

a~ter

Morbidity and

mortality statistics are helpful and continue to be an
important element of medical care appraisal.
To measure quality, the indicator used for purposes
of this study will be DRG specific death rates expressed
as a percentage of deaths over one year statistically
controlling for the number of discharges per DRG
category.

In the literature review, we mention the

conspicuous production theory of the nonprofit firm
<Lin,

1971) which models the hospital with decision

makers who are driven by prestige and work towards
transforming their organization into its
(prestigious>."

Newhouse

(1970)

11

desired status

reiterated a similar

argument but extended this to include quality and
quantity.

In our model here, death rates per DRG is

used as a criterion to indicate that level of quality
that all hospitals meet.

Regardless of ownership

status, all hospitals are under regulatory constraints,
fear of malpractice suits, and have the potential threat
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to the

hospital~s

reputation or status.

As presented in the preceding pages, the framework
for this analysis include institutional variables such
as bed size and location.

Ef~iciency

variables are

measured in terms of occupancy rates, ancillary
expenses, bad debts, manhours per patient day, salaries
per FTE, average length of stay per DRS, charges per
DRG, and reimbursements per DRS.

As measures of equity,

the number of Medicare and Medicaid patients days will
be examined;

also, the amount of uncompensated care

expenditures will be included in the analysis.

As an

indicator of quality, death rates per DRG among
nonprofit, government, and forprofit hospitals are
compared.
The succeeding chapter will describe the methods
used for this study.

It describes the selection of the

population, data management, and data analysis.
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CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY
In the preceding chapter, the framework for

analysis was described and several hypotheses were
stated.

The study population, data management, and

statistical methods for analysis will be described in
the following pages.
Study Population.

In selecting the study

setting~

there were numerous limitations related to logistics as
well as our present knowledge of the hospital setting.
The State of Florida is one of the sun-belt regions
where growth of both nonprofit and forprofit hospitals
has been observed.

Most notablyy Florida has 44% of

forprofit hospitals as a percentage of nonfederal shortterm general hospitals, second only to the State of
Nevada with SO%

<AHA,

1984; FAH,

1984).

The

attractiveness of Florida to retirees means that
enrollees in Medicare will be substantial.

This is

important because DRG reimbursement rules apply to
Medicare patients. Our analysis on the top twenty DRGs
apply to Medicare patients only.

Thus, a study setting
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in this area is appropriate.

As of July, 1983 there

were over 1.5 million persons enrolled in Medicare
<Florida Statistical Abstract 1985>.
preference by forprofit
Florida.

There is a clear

hospitals for areas such as

Preferred locations are those noted to be with

greatest increases in per capita income and population
and

widespread insurance coverage <Mullner and Hadley,

1984>.

Same of these considerations make Florida ideal

as the setting for this study.
The area of South Florida with three counties [Palm
Beach, Broward, and Dade] is selected because of the
availability of data for the variables under
investigation.

With 35% of hospitals with over 100

beds, offering acute, general care located in South
Florida, the advantages of using the existing data set
far outweighed extending the sampling throughout the
State <considering the unavailability of data for other
areas>.
In South Florida, there are over half a million
Medicare enrollees.
212~293

There are 140,608 in Palm Beach,

in Broward, and 226,625 in Dade

CFSA, 1986>.

This is important for this study since one focus of the
analysis deals with the issue of equity measured in
terms of the number of Medicare days, Medicaid days, and
amounts of Uncompensated care.

Considering this, let us

look at the economic status in these areas.

The median
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family income for Palm Beach for a family of two is
$16,665, and for a family of three, $19,817.
percentage of families with incomes
level is 6.7.

belo~

The

the poverty

In Broward, the income for a family of

two was $16,580 and $19,592 for a family of three.
percentage of families
was 6.3.

~ith

The

incomes below poverty level

In Dade, with incomes of $15,571 for a family

of two and $18,642, the percentage of families with
incomes below the poverty level was highest of the three
counties

at 11.9 <FSA,

1985>.

The hospitals in the three counties which will be
selected shall be those which offer acute care, general
services with at least 100 beds.

It was explained

earlier that smaller bed size may account for certain
services not being offered by a hospital.

By virtue of

the size, resource requirements would vary also.
Therefore, population selection using a minimum bed size
as a criterion is important.

Fifty-six hospitals in

south Florida met the preceding criteria.
Data Management.

The data were obtained from the

Hospital Cost Containment Board
Professional Review Organization

<HCCB> and the
<PRO>.

Since the DRG-

based reimbursement provision of the Tefra Act was
signed in 1982, there was a three-year phase in period
for all hospitals.

Hospitals ended their fiscal

years

differently, hence each hospital had a different base

79

year.

To ensure hospitals were at least one year under

DRG-based reimbursement,

1984 data were obtained.

The

ideal study would track results over the entire phase-in
period.

However, data processing takes time.

Medicare

billing claims have not been completely processed and
can not be made available for this study by the PRO.
These PRO data were submitted by the hospitals to a
Fiscal

Intermediary who processed the claims.

The

Intermediary then provided the PRO with the electronic
copy of the processed claim.

The data passed through

numerous edits and were in excess of 98X correct.

The

data for the following variables were derived from this
report:

average length of stay per DRG, average patient

charges per DRG, average hospital reimbursement per DRG,
and percent of death rates per DRG.

The data from the

Hospital Cost Containment Board were compiled from each
hospital budget submitted to the Board for approval.
These budgets are compiled annually and reports are
published by the Board which are available for public
information.
the Board.

Copies of the budgets were purchased from
Data for specific variables under study were

derived from these reports

<Occupancy Rates, Ancillary

Expenses, Bad Debts, Manhours per Patient Day, Salaries
per FTE, Medicare, Medicaid, Uncompensated Care>.
Data Analysis.

The primary method for analyses of

data is analysis of va~iance using the Statistical
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Package for the Social Sciences <SPSS>.

This program

was run via Xerox mainframe computers at the Computer
Services Division of the Miami Heart Institute.
of limitations inherent in the computer
two data sets

(1)

1984 PRO DRG data and

Because

hardware~

<2>

the

1984 HCCB

Budget data were entered under separate files.
The coding scheme utilized for hospitals by
ownership was derived from the grouping system by the

HCCB:

HCCB

CODE

DEFINITION

3a

1

church-operated, nonprofit

3b

2

other, nonprofit

3c

3

individual, forprofit

3d

4

partnership, forprofit

3e

5

corporation, forprofit

3f

6

federal government

3g

7

city government

3h

8

hospital district authority

3i

9

state

3j

10

city-county

3k

11

county

For comparisons by ownership status, hospitals were
grouped as nonprofit
forprofit

(1, 2>, government

<4, 5) hospitals.

<8, 10, 11>, and

No hospitals in the sample

belonged to categories 3, 6, 7, and 9.
For comparisons by location, each hospital was
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categorized according to its geographic area based on
the standard Metropolitan Statistical Area

CMSA>.

The

following scheme was used for coding purposes:
10

=

Palm Beach County

20

=

Broward County

30

=

Dade County

The statistical methods employed to analyze the
data include the following:

C1>

Descriptive Statistics were obtained by using

subprogram Condescriptive, Frequencies, and Breakdown.
<2>

The three hospital ownership types were

compared on the Institutional Variables using one-way
analysis of variance.
[ BEDS J

by

[ NONPROFIT, GOVERNMENT, FORPROFIT J

[ LOC J

by

[ NONPROFIT, GOVERNMENT, FORPROFIT J

(3)

If necessary, dependent variables are compared

on paired hospital ownership types,
forprofit or forprofit vs.
For the analyses,

i. e.

nonprofit vs.

government.

involving the Efficiency

Variables, the following ANOVA model was used for the
hospital budget data comparisons:
[ DCC, ANCI, DEBT, HOUR, SAL J BY
[ NONPROFIT, GOVERNMENT, FDRPROFIT J WITH

[ BEDS, LOCJ
For the DRG data analysis of the top twenty DRGs,
each DRG category was analyzed using the following
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model:

[ STAY, CHARGES, REIM PER DRS ] BY
[ NONPROFIT, GOVERNMENT, FORPROFIT ] WITH

[ DISCHARGES l
For the analyses, involving the equity variables,
the

follo~ing

ANOVA model was used for the hospital

budget data comparisons:

[ CARE, CAID, UNCOMP l BY
[ NONPROFIT, GOVERNMENT, FORPROFIT l WITH
[ BEDS, LOC J
For the quality variable, analysis was done using
the following model:

( DEATH RATES PER DRG ] BY
[ NONPROFIT, GOVERNMENT, FORPROFIT J WITH
[ DISCHARGES

J

The fit of the model using bed size was judged
better than the model using occupancy rates based on
trial statistical analyses made using ANOVA, and later
analysis of covariance.
compared.

R squares and ETAs were

In general, R-squares with [ BEDS] rather

than [ DCC ] as a covariate were higher.

The tables

report the F-scores for the ANOVA runs with [ BEDS
[ LOC J as a covariate.
etc ] used

( BEDS

J

J

and

Paired tests [ i. e. NP vs FP,

only as a covariate.

Using Options 7 and 10 of SPSS ANDVA, the effect of
covariates was assessed concurrently with the factors.
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This option allows to remove

<statistically) extraneous

variation in the dependent variable that is attributable
to covariates included in the model.
measurement precision.

This increases

In this case, the decomposition

of explained variance in the dependent variable would be
quite similar to a regression analysis involving both
metric and dummy variables as predictors.

Each printout

was examined in terms of main effects and the
contribution of each factor to the overall significance
of differences.

Because the model used here is

essentially a factorial design with unequal cell
frequencies,

the component sums of squares do not add up

to the total sums of squares since the main effects and
the interaction effects are not independent.

Thus, even

if the F-value for the additive model is significant,

one or more of the factors may or may not be
significant.

Therefore, each F-value is examined for

significance and the F-value for the specific factor
<not the additive main effects>

is reported in all the

For interactions,

tables throughout the text.

covariate by factor analyses were processed.

[ Note:

Factors are the nonmetric categorical variable i.
ownership status of hospitals:
forprofit.

nonprofit, government,

Covariates are used to designate a metric

independent variable i.
discharges.

e.

]

e.

number of beds or number of

Hospital budget data analyses showed
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significant interaction

e~~ects.

Consequently, multiple

classification analyses become meaningless
1973;
show

Nie, et.

al.,

signi~icant

1975).

<Andrews,

For analyses which do not

interaction effects, the deviations

from the mean adjusted for independents
are reported to clarify the
negative deviation from

~~e

among nonpro{'t, government,

direct1~n

a~d

covariates

<positive or

grand mean)

of differences

and forprofit hospitals.

Obtaining the data for all

variables for different

hospitals falling under specific ownership categories
was limited to the South Florida area.
sample is small, statistical
As

1n

Because the

validity concerns arise.

the case of this study, the criteria for hospital

selection i .

e. acute care only with 100 beds and over

brought us fifty-six

hospitals.

categories resulted to unequal

Three ownership
cell sizes which

complicate the use of ANOVA.
There are problems regarding the potential
violation of

the ANOVA assumptions such as normality of

distribution and homogeneity of variance.
this,

nonparametric tests of significance were done on

the budget data set using Mann-Whitney.
of

To address

The computation

the test statistic can be described as fallows:

two samples are combined and assigned a

smallest to largest.

The

rank +rom

The sum of ranks from the first

population is obtained.

If

the location parameter of
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population 1 is smaller than the location parameter of
population 2, we expect the sum of the ranks for
population 1 to be smaller than the sum of the ranks for
papulation

~

~,

or VIce
versa.

The test statistic is

based on the rationale that depending on the null
hypothesis, either a sufficiently small or a
sufficiently large sum of ranks assigned to sample
observations from population 1 causes us to reject the
null

hypothesis

<Daniel,

1978>.

The significance level of the results of MannWhitney tests are reported far each table comparing
pairs of hospitals.

It is important to note that Mann-

Whitney analyses does not allow us to control far bed
size or location.

Thus, tables an paired tests report

both ANOVA and Mann-Whitney results.

In addition, one

government hospital outlier was dropped in separate
analyses.

These results are indicated as well.

Other appropriate tests of significance were also
used where appropriate, such as Chi-square for the
analyses on distribution of hospitals by location.
Multiple regression analyses with and without dummy
variables were used in certain instances.
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CHAPTER V

RESULTS
This chapter presents the study results

follo~ing

the framework for analysis presented in Chapter III.

In•titutional Variabl••
Fifty-six hospitals met the criteria for inclusion
in the study with reference to types of service offered.
These hospitals offered acute care, general services and
all have current licenses required by governmental
authorities having jurisdiction.

The study population

are subcategorized into nonprofit

(21 hospitals:

church-operated, 20 non-church operated>,
hospitals~

government

1 county, 7 hospital district authority>,

and forprofit
corporation

1

( 27 hospitals:

o~ned>.

2 partnership, 25

According to location,

18 percent

of hospitals are located in Palm Beach; 32 percent in
Broward;

and 50 percent in Dade County.

Two hypotheses were advanced in Chapter III
regarding bed size [All, and location [A2J.

We test

these twa hypotheses using analysis of variance.

(8
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Bed Size

[

Hypothesis All.

Table I

shows that

government hospitals have the highest mean bed size of

TABLE I

BED CAPACITY BV OWNERSHIP

I

OWNERSHIP

MEANS

NONPROFIT

338

GOVERNMENT

4SO

FORPROFIT

246

BRAND MEAN

310

F-SCORE

BIB.

R2

.02

4.21

.14

450 and forprofit hospitals with the least at 246.
differences were statistically significant at

The

< .OS.

Comparing the forprofit hospitals and the
nonprofit hospitals only
.01

( Mean

=

286;

F

=

=

5.91; Sig.

J, the results show that differences were

statistically significant.

In comparing nonprofit

hospitals and government hospitals, the results show no
statistical significance ( Mean

=

369; F

=

1.34; Sig.

=

NS l.

As cited previously, a study of 1985 data for 160
Florida hospitals, forprofit hospitals are significantly
smaller

<Sorrentino,

1985>.

This is consistent with the

analysis of the 56 South Florida hospitals.

Forprofits

by virtue of their smaller size, thus, would have
different resource requirements -- probably less if the
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property rights view 1s true.

This further justifies

the need to control for bed size in data analysis.
Location [Hypothesis A2J.

The tabulation on

hospital location is shown in Table II.

TABLE I I 1

CROSSTABULATION BY OWNERSHIP BY LOCATION

OWNERSHIP

PALM BEACH

BROWARD

DADE

NONPROFIT

4

2

1~

GOVERNMENT

3

4

1

FORPROFIT

3

12

12

32.14

so.oo

17.96

PERCENT

Note the distribution of hospitals in the three
counties by ownership status according to location.
Dade County has the largest share of hospitals at 50%,
Differences in bed

followed by Broward at 32/..

capacity by location were insignificant with the mean
bed size in Palm Beach at 232,
Dade at 337

( See Table

III

Broward at 310,

and

>.

To test A2, analysis of variance

showed the

relationship of bed size by ownership status to location
as significantly different at less than .05 <F=4.04;
square = .24>, nate Table
relationship,

IV •

r-

Further analyzing the

to test for differences in the number of

hospitals by ownership type in the three geographic
areas, chi-square test was done.

The results of chi-
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TABLE

III I

BED CAPACITY BY LOCATION

LOCATION
PALM

MEANS

BEACH

310

DADE

337

GRAND MEAN

310

IV1

SIB.

1.oe

NB

R2

232

BROWARD

TABLE

F-SCORE

• 04

BED CAPACITY BY OWNERSHIP BY LOCATION

OWNERSHIP

MEANS

NONPROFIT

338

GOVERNMENT

4~0

FORPROFIT

246

GRAND MEAN

310

F-SCDRE

BIG.

R2

4.04

<.O~

.24

square at 12.85 was significant at .01.
In Dade,
hospitals.

there is a majority of nonprofit

Both Dade and

Bro~ard

65 population enrolled in Medicare
215,873 for Broward;

have higher over age
(227,729 for Dade and

147,242 for Palm Beach>.

Income

levels for both Dade and Broward counties are lower than
Palm Beach
Beach

( For a family of 3 average income in Palm

is $19,817;

$18,642).

Broward with $19,592:

Dade with

Note that there are more forprofit hospitals

in Dade and Broward than in Palm Beach, even i f the
ave~age

income here is

lo~er.

It is important to
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consider, though, that population density may play
role in location preferences.

a

Government hospitals,

though, are seen in greater proportion in Palm Beach and
Broward counties.

In both areas, fewer nonprofit

hospitals exist in proportion to Dade County
12

nonpro~it

<There are

hospitals in Dade as opposed to 10 in

Broward and 4 in Palm Beach).

To illustrate this, note

that in 1985, Dade ranked third in Florida in terms of
population density with 900 persons per square mile or
15.59/. of the State population.
with a population density
or 9.96%

o~

o~

Broward ranked second

928 persons per square mile

the state population.

Palm Beach ranked

tenth in the state with 358 persons per square mile or
6.32/. of the state population.

Overall, hospital beds

per person are highest in Dade County.
per 100,000 persons are as follows:
550;

Broward

=

514;

Conclusion.

The total beds

state = 456; Dade

Palm Beach= 388 CFSA,

1986).

The study findings showed that

government and nonprofit hospitals have larger bed size
than forprofits.

Chapter II and III explained why bed

size differs among hospital ownership types.
Specifically, we alluded to the profit maximization
behavior in the forprofit hospital by limiting resource
requirements thru bed size limitations;

the nonprofit

and government hospital behavior point to output
maximization.

Property rights suggest output

=
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maximization in the nonprofit and government hospital
because

o~

the social obligations attached to their tax

exemption status.

These expectations mean that these

hospitals would maximize quantity of service.

In order

to render services, the hospitals must have enough beds.
Therefore, we see the larger bed size in the nonprofit
and government hospitals <See discussion on pp. 29-31;
48-49).

The evidence is consistent with the property

rights argument.
The analyses on location show evidence in support
of the property rights view.

Location preferences by

forprofit hospitals depend on barriers to entry such as
certificate of need requirements and potential
profitability in certain geographic areas depending on
market share, competition, demand and health insurance
reimbursement rules.

In this regard, occupancy rates

indicate hospital utilization which reflects the
behavior of the hospital
pages.

and is discussed in the latter

Because this study was done in one homogeneous

area, the potential confounding variable OT
reimbursement rules is controlled for.

Forprofit

hospitals prefer to locate in areas where the hospital
can project a reasonable census even during the summer
months.

The study results confirm this as shown in the

papulation densities in Dade and Broward Counties and
the preponderance of forprofit hospitals in these areas.
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It should be pointed out that in this study, the
hospital age has not been explored.

This is an

interesting variable to consider from an institutional
standpoint because of its potential role in what types
of hospitals are built in certain locations.

Particularly with newer hospitals, the restriction on
where to build and how much to build may depend on what
types and number of hospitals are already present in a
locale.

Efficiency Variabl••
The tests for significance of differences were done
following the model specified in Chapter IV.

Bed size

and location were used as covariates in the analyses for
three categories.

Occupancy Rates [Hypothesis BlJ.

TABLE

VI

Table

V

shows

OCCUPANCY RATES BY OWNERSHIP

OWNERSHIP

MEAN

MEDIAN

NONPROFIT

74.7

76.9

GOVERNMENT

78.7

79.6

FORPROFIT

66.6

6t'5.6

GRAND MEAN

71.4

F-SCORE

4.36

BIG.

.01

significant results.
These findings are consistent with the findings for
the entire state of Florida in 1985 (Sorrentino,

1985>.

Both nonprofit and government hospitals show higher
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occupancy rates.

Further testing for differences,

nonprofits were compared with forprofits.

Significant

differences were at the .05 level; note Table VI.

TABLE

VI1

OCCUPANCY RATES BY OWNERSHIP
M-W
SIB

AN OVA

F-SCORE
NP vs FP
NP vs 9

SIG

4.88

.os

.87

NB

FP vs B

.OS2

<.o~

Nonprofits have higher occupancy rates as compared to
forprofit hospitals by 8.1%.

An implication cited

earlier in this framework was that government hospitals
and nonprofit hospitals may attempt to expand units of
service, i.e. output maximization.

When nonprofits were

compared to government hospitals, no significant
difference was found

<F = .87).

However, government

hospitals had higher occupancy rates than nonprofits by
4/..

Forprofit hospital occupancy rates were lower in

relation to the government hospital by 12.1/..
Nate the differences when examining median values.
Testing these differences using Mann-Whitney analyses
show that nonprofits compared to forprofits are not
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significantly different at the .05 level.

Eliminating

one government hospital outlier, forprofit hospitals
compared to government hospitals did not show
dif~erences

significant

at the .05 level.

Thus, using

this sample in South Florida, we fail to find support
for the property rights theory.
The forprofit hospital has been proposed to ensure
profitability in two ways:
rates, and

(2)

(1)

increase occupancy

reduce staffing levels and other

associated expenses.

The forprofit hospitals, on a

national average consistently run lower occupancy rates

<AHA,

1984>.

According to HCCB data on occupancy rates

for all hospital types, occupancy rates are down
6.7/. in the state as of the last half of 1985 <HCCB,

1985>.

Nonprofit and government hospitals showed

significantly higher occupancy rates than forprofit
hospitals

<Sorrentino,

1985).

This trend can be viewed

as a product of increasing competition among hospitals
rather than a failure on the part of forprofit hospitals
to maximize utilization of hospital beds.
There is movement towards greater market
competition among individual facilities within various
areas.

In Florida, the difficulty in examining inter-

hospital competition vis-a-vis ownership type
differences is complicated by the effect of population
size an natural monopoly.

In 1980, only seven of the
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nineteen Metropolitan Statistical Areas CMSAs>
Florida

C36.3'l.>

in

continued to have 50'l. or more of all

patient days delivered by a single institution.

All

nineteen MSAs, except for Tallahassee and Fort Walton
Beach, showed declines in market shares.

Miami, St.

Petersburg, and Fort Lauderdale all showed declines in
the market share of the top four hospitals <FSA,
These changes in hospital market structure are

1986>.

re~lected

in hospital ownership in the State; note Table VII.

TABLE

VII•

STATE OF FLORIDA BEDS PATIENT DAVB
AND HOSPITAL TYPE
NONPROFIT

1970
1980

PCT. CHANGE

1970

GOVERNMENT

FCRPROFIT

31.9X

12.BX

48.8

20.3

30.9

-6.~

-11.6

18.1

~7.7

33.~

e.e

18.6

1980
-2.2

-14.9

17.1

1970

48.7

27.9

23.4

1980

42.~

17.1

40.3

-6.2

-10.8

16.9

PCT. CHANGE

PCT. CHANGE

In 1980, the market share of forprofit hospitals
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was doubled
re~lects

a

(from 23.4X in 1970 to 40.3X in 1980>.
16.9f. increase in a decade.

This

Their share of

beds grew by 141/. and patient days by 194X.

The

nonprofit and government hospitals lost market shares in
all categories between 1970 and 1980.

The proportion of

government hospitals decreased by 10.87., their market
share of beds by 11.6/., and the total patient days
declined by 14.9/..
declines as well.

The nonprofit hospitals showed

So, when one looks at occupancy rate

statistics, even if occupancy rates were higher in
nonprofit and government institutions, despite
controlling for bed size and location, i t is important
to consider the effect of increased competition.
We need to consider the fact that even though
forprofit hospitals have lower occupancy rates, i t is
possible that the types of patients occupying forprofit
beds differ.

A profit seeking hospital might prefer to

have lower occupancy rates providing that services are
reimbursed through private insurance or by the patients
themselves paying aut-of-pocket.
examining occupancy rates,

Therefore, when

i t is wise to investigate the

differences in types of insurance payers, i. e.

patients

occupying beds who are Medicare recipients and under DRG
reimbursements or patients who do not have the means to
pay.

will be
The number of Medicare and Medicaid days

examined later.

In addition to this, the amount of bad
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debts incurred by the hospital

is examined with the

thought that caring for patients who do not have the
means to pay might cause the hospital to have higher bad
debts.
Ancillary Expenses [Hypothesis B2J.

VIII.

Note Table

Differences were significant at less than .01.

TABLE VIIIa

ANCILLARY EXPENSES BY OWNERSHIP

OWNERSHIP

MEAN

MEDIAN

NONPROFIT

13.6

11.6

GOVERNMENT

19.1

12.4

e.o

7.4

FORPROFIT
BRAND MEAN

11.7

F-SCORE

SIB.

<.01

49.48

Hospital ownership types were paired to test if
differences were significant;

TABLE

IX1

ANCILLARY EXPENSES
ANOVA

NP
FP

v•
v•

NP vs

note Table IX.

ANOVA

M-W
BIG

F-SCORE

BIG

a

16.67

<.01

NB CNS*>

G

~3.34

<.01

NS CNS•>

FP

38.56

<.01

.o~

Analysis of variance results comparing mean
differences show significance at <.01.

Comparing

nonprofit and government hospitals only, the results
shaw that nonprofit hospitals spent less than the
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government hospitals

($5.5 mil.>.

Comparing the

farprofits to government hospitals, government hospitals
spent more than

~arprofits

by $11.1million.

Comparing

nonprofit hospitals to forprafit hospitals, forpro+its
spent less by $5.6 million.
Mann-Whitney results comparing medians show
nonprofits with lower ancillary expenses than government
hospitals by $.8 million; this is not significant.
Forprofits compared to government hospitals were lower
by $5.0 million;
Comparing

this is not statistically significant.

nonpro~its

to forprofits, forprofits were

lower by $4.2 million;

this is statistically significant

at .05.
This discrepancy in findings suggests that the
distribution of ancillary expenses in government
hospitals may not be normal.

Also, bear in mind that

Mann-Whitney analyses did not control

~or

bed size and

location.
To examine further what might explain these
di~ferences

in ancillary expenses, attention should be

given to the fact that ancillary expenses here are not
broken down by disease category.
gross measure.

At best it is a very

Let us analyze the relationship of this

measure with several indicators in the study sample.
Using multiple regression analysis, beds, the percentage
of bad debts, uncompensated care~ the number of Medicare

99
days, and Medicaid days were used as predictors
ancillary services.

The findings show R square at 91.2X

<<.001>, Medicare days <<.OS>, and Medicaid

with beds
days

~or

<<.005) as statistically significant predictors.

This finding is relevant in our analyses on hospital
ownership.

Clearly, this shows that bed size is a

definite factor in determining ancillary service
expenditures.

We look into the possibility that the

number of Medicare days and Medicaid days among three
hospital types might contribute to the variation in
ancillary expenses.
five predictors

Regression analysis is done with

(nonprofit, government, bed size,

Medicare days, and Medicaid days).

No statistically

significant difference was discerned on ownership
categories.
days

However, bed size, Medicare days, Medicaid

( t-ratias 5.97,

1.96, 2.64 respectively ) were

statistically significant predictors for ancillary
expenses

<R square= 91.3/.).

expenses on three predictors:
government hospitals
reference category).

We regress ancillary

bed size, nonprofit, and

(with forprofits used as a
Our findings confirm beds as a

statistically significant predictor with a t-ratio of
19.77 <R square= 90/.).

Nonprofit and government

hospitals failed to show statistical significance.

Note

that in our earlier analysis we found higher occupancy
rates in the government and nonprofit hospitals.
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Regression analysis is done with three predictors
(occupancy rates, nonprofit, and government>.

We find

that occupancy rates and government hospitals as
statistically significant
respectively>.

<t-ratios were 2.63 and 1.98

The R square is 2SX ••

The findings we have show that variations in
ancillary expenses can be attributed to variations in
bedsize, occupancy rates, Medicare days, and Medicaid
days.

The Mann-Whitney analysis showed significantly

higher ancillary expenses in the nonprofit hospitals as
compared to the forprofit hospitals.

However,

multiple regression analysis failed to show
statistically significant differences between
nonprofit/government hospitals compared to the forprofit
hospital.

This analysis of ancillary expenses failed to

show support of the property rights theory.
Bad Debts (Hypothesis 83].

Table

X below shows

statistically significant differences at less than .01.
Government hospitals have the highest percent of bad

TABLE

Xa

OWNERSHIP
NONPROFIT
GOVERNMENT

BAD DEBTS BY OWNERSHIP
MEAN

MEDIAN

F-SCORE

SIB.

16.07

<.01

3.79

10.48

FORPROFIT

3.91

GRAND MEAN

4.90
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debts.

Table XI shows the paired analyses.

Comparing

nonprofit hospitals with government hospitals, note that
bad debts in the government hospitals were significantly
higher

C6.70X>.

Compared to forprofit hospitals,

forprofits have lower bad debts (-6.57'l.> than government
hospitals.

TABLE

XII

See Table XI below:

BAD DEBTS
ANOVA

ANOVA

M-W

F-SCORE

BIB.

SIS.

NP

v•

a

17.4S

<.01

<.01

FP

vs

G

24.68

<.01

<.01 C<. Ol•>

NP

v•

FP

.os

NS

((.01*)

NB

There appears to be a similarity between the
nonprofit and forprofit hospital.

Comparing nonprofit

hospitals to forprofit hospitals in terms of bad debts,
the difference was not statistically significant.
This lends support for hospital behavior along the lines
of the recovery of cost or meeting budget constraints
for the nonprofit sector, and profit maximization in the
forprofit sector.

This could also be a reflection of

output maximization in the government hospital.

The

similarity between nonprofit and forprofit hospitals on
bad debts may suggest that some factor other than
property rights could explain the difference.

Lower bad

debts may imply internal operations which facilitate

102

processing of bills or the collection of unpaid ones.

It could also mean that the patient clientele of the
hospital are insured;

therefore, bills are paid or they

have patients who have the means to pay, and thus do not
incur bad debts.

Attempting to explore these

possibilities, we regress bad debts on bed size,
Medicare days, Medicaid days, and the percentage of
uncompensated care.

Our findings show that only

uncompensated care was a statistically significant
predictor

<<.01).

We will do further analysis on

uncompensated care as an equity variable later.
Manhours [Hypothesis B4J.

Comparing all three

hospital types controlling for bed size, differences
were statistically significant at less than .01.

TABLE XII1

MANHOURS PER PATIENT DAY BY OWNERSHIP

OWNERSHIP

MEANS

MEDIAN

NONPROFIT

21.99

21.17

GOVERN11ENT

21.76

20.97

FORPROFIT

17.94

18.04

BRAND MEAN

20.11

F-SCORE

2S.6B

SIG.

<.01

There were fewer manhours per patient day in the
forprafit hospital.

This was statistically significant

compared to nonprofit and government hospitals
XIII>.

<Table
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TABLE

XIII•

MANHOURS PER PATIENT DAY

ANOVA

AN OVA

M-W

SIB.

SIB.

F-SCORE
NP

FP
NP

v•
v•
v•

G

.04

NS

NB

a

20.12

<.01

<.01

39.86

<.01

<.01

CFP>

CNB•>
((. 01*)

The difference was not significant between the nonprofit
and the government hospital.
The importance of manhours in determining casts of
delivering care is further exemplified as follows.

In

the analysis of 160 acute care general hospitals in the
state of Florida using 1985 HCCB budget data, the number
of manhours per patient day was demonstrated to be a
significant predictor in the variation of average cost
per patient day
(ADMCOST>.
XIV>

<DAYCOST>

and average cost per admission

Analysis of variance results

<Note Table

shows manhour differences among nonprofit,

government, and forprofit hospitals at less than .01
<Sorrentino,

TABLE XIV•

1985>.

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS FOR 1985 DATA

VARIABLE

F-SCORE

BIG.

R2

DAY COST

2.93

NS

.12

ADMCOST

2.4~

NS

.42

<.01

.39

MANHOURS

26.26
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A cost-conscious, pro~it-seeking hospital has been
theorized to reduce manhours per patient day to reduce
costs associated with labor.
analysis was done using
Medicare days,

Multiple regression

nonpro~it,

government, bed size,

and Medicaid days as predictors.

the R square at 47.1/..

We

con~irmed

di~ferences

We

~ind

in

ownership categories but failed to see statistically
significant t-ratios on bed size, Medicare days, and
Medicaid days

(1.56, -1.06, -.62 respectively>.

Our results give support for cost-reducing behavior
in the forprofit sector and this could also mean
differences in services offered.

You will recall that

ather goals such as education and research were
identified with nonprofit and government hospitals.
the same time,

there may be certain services provided to

patients in government and

nonpro~it

hospitals which
Although the

could affect their resource requirements.
study population selected only hospitals

o~~ering

care general services, within these groups
there are other sources
not a

At

o~

a~

acute

hospitals,

variations such as whether or

hospital has resources to allow specialty services

such as open heart surgery.

This type

procedure is resource intensive.
specially trained
technicians,

sta~f

o~

a~

surgical

It requires a

physicians, nurses, and

as well as sophisticated operating rooms,

cardiac catheterization laboratories, heart/lung bypass
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machines,

intra-aortic counterpulsation devices, and

hemodynamic monitoring of all cardiac function
parameters.

Let us examine closely, this aspect of

service in the three hospital types.
As of 1986, there were twenty centers in Florida
with capabilities to provide for open heart surgery.
Nine hospitals in our study population Tor Dade County
offer this service.
one

<1>

Of these, seven

government, and one

used to be nonprofit until

<7>

are nonprofit,

<1> forprofit

<The hospital

i t was purchased by an

investor-chain corporation.).

In Dade County, from the

period of January 1 to December 1, 1985, a total of 1874
open heart surgeries were performed

<HCSF,

1986).

Of

these, nonprofit hospitals did 84/. <1560>, the
government hospital did ll'l.
hospital did 5%

(98).

<216>, and the forprofit

Actual cost to a hospital for

doing these procedures are unobtainable.
through personal communications,

However,

i t was determined that

the amounts reimbursed under DRG limitations for a
simple cardiac catheterization
heart surgery)

is only $6,935 and for a coronary artery

bypass graft is $16,314.

Administrators contend that in

general, these patients are
often than not,

<required prior to open

11

money-losers" because more

the patients require a longer

hospitalization period than projected under DRGs.
Obviously, forprofits will not have the incentive to
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perform this kind of procedure.
Each hospital was examined for the number of
manhours per patient day.

It was not surprising to find

that the mean of 24.40 hours for these hospitals was
statistically different from the grand mean of 20 for
all hospitals in the study.

Thus, a hospital that seeks

to maximize profits would reduce costs by decreasing
labor requirements.
here,

The obvious way, as we have seen

is not to offer certain types of services that are

resource intensive.
We analyze the data further in our study
population, relating variation in manhours with
ancillary expenses.

Using multiple regression, we use

ancillary services, nonprofity and government as
predictors for manhours.

With an R square of 48.4/., we

note that ancillary expenses, nonprofit, and government
hospitals as statistically significant predictors of
manhours

< t-ratios of 2.42, 5.27, 3.0 respectively).

In sum, a

forprofit hospital seeking to maximize

profits may limit its services to those who do not
require substantial resources that impinge on residual
profits.

From what is demonstrated at the micro level,

i t is notable that there is output maximization

terms of cardiac surgeries)

(in

in the nonprofit hospitals.

This finding also helps to explain hospital behavior
using the

41

desired status 11 rationale by Lin

(1971>.

As
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a high-tech procedure, one might say that open heart
surgeries are

11

prestige enhancers ...

In Chapter III, i t was noted that reducing costs
associated with labor would be a mechanism to maximize
profits.

Seeking proof of this, the salaries per FTE

were compared.
Salaries per FTE (Hypothesis BSJ.

Here, the

results were not significant. Note Table XV.

TABLE XVa

SALARIES PER F. T. E. BV OWNERSHIP

OWNERSHIP

MEAN

MEDIAN

NONPROFIT

19792

20320

GOVERNMENT

186~4

194~7

FORPROFIT

1979~

19260

GRAND MEAN

19631

BIG.

NS

Nonprofit hospital salaries were practically
identical to forprofit salaries, but paid slightly more
in comparison to government hospitals.

TABLE XVI 1

SALARIES PER F. T. E
A NOVA

M-W

F-SCORE

SIG.

BIG.

3.2~

NB <NS>

NS

<NS>

<NB)

NS

CNS>

ANOVA

NP v• CG>
FP

v•

CG)

2.06

NS

NP

va

<FP>

0

NB

NS
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There is no support for the property rights
position as i t relates to salaries per FTE; note Table
XVI.

Although we did not find differences as to

ownership categories, the comparisons by location did
show statistically significant differences at <.01 with

Palm Beach having the lowest and Dade having the most.
It is important to note, though, that there are
other factors to consider, such

as bonuses or profit-

sharing plans for administrative staff which are not
reflected under salaries per FTE.

Stock options, for

example, can not be measured in terms of salaries per
FTE.
In search of evidence of hospital behavior
differences, using the top twenty DRGs for all the
hospitals under study, the length of stay per DRG,
charges per DRG, and reimbursements per DRG were
analyzed yielding the following results.
Length of Stay per DRG [Hypothesis B6J.
XVII

Note Table

showing all twenty DRGs by hospital ownerhip

status.

The findings show that only 7 of 20 DRGs <35/.)

were significantly different in terms of length of stay.
These were DRG 82

<Respiratory Neoplasms>, DRG 140

<Angina), DRG 243

(Medical Back Problems>, Drg 296

<Nutritional and Miscellaneous Metabolic Disorders; age
aver 69), DRG 320

<Kidney and Urinary Tract Infections;
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TABLE

XVIII

LENGTH OF STAY BY DRG BY OWNERSHIP

DRG

GRAND
MEAN

NONPROF

14

10.46

10.89

10.9~

9.94

.84

ns

.07

15

~.61

~.47

~.39

~.eo

.37

n•

.07

82

8.70

9.70

9.98

7.46

3.S9

.03

.18

as

7.84

8.28

8.02

7.41

1.14

ns

.13

89

9.49

9.70

9.12

a. eo

.47

n•

.32

96

7.0~

7.~9

6.03

6.91

2.91

n•

.1S

122

9.2~

9.S4

a.e~

9.13

.46

ns

.18

127

e.oe

8.39

7.99

7.86

1. 03

n•

.32

138

~.76

~.78

6.09

~.64

.3S

n•

.17

140

5.34

~.73

~.19

~.06

6.6~

<.01 .32

148

16.38

16.07

14.~1

17.22

1. 73

n•

.22

174

6.71

6.98

~.92

6.73

1. so

n•

.18

182

~.70

~.62

~-7~

~.76

.10

ns

.07

210

1~.01

15.89

13.00

15.13

1.36

n•

• 29

243

7.4~

7.96

6.3~

7.36

4.18

.o~

• 39

294

7.80

7.80

7.74

7.83

.01

ns .19

296

7.72

6.9S

9.79

7.73

4.8~

.01 .17

320

7.97

8.47

6.:57

7.98

3.73

.o~

• 26

336

7.6~

7.~9

6.01

8.21

3.36

.o~

.33

468

14.44

13.83

21.~0

12.79

6.81

CELL MEANS
GOVT FORPROF

F-BCORE

BIG.

R2

<.01 .22
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over 69 with complications and comorbidity>, DRS 336
<Transurethral Prostatectomy; age over 69 with
complications and comorbidity>, and DRG 468 <Unrelated
Operating Room Procedure to a given Medical Diagnostic
Category>.

On 13 out of 20 DRGs <65'l.>, the length of

stay was not statistically

dif~erent.

The analytical framework implied that government
hospitals by virtue of their size may be able to offer
needed services.

This is consistent, as

~ell,

~ith

the

public interest motive or expansion of services to
society.

Note that on Table XVIII, government hospitals

had the highest lengths of stay on five DRS categories,
nonprofits were highest on ten DRG categories, and
forprofits were highest in five DRG categories.

We test

for significance to see evidence of longer lengths of
stay, even though

~ith

DRG reimbursement rules there is

increased incentive to decrease lengths of stay.

The

DRG analysis was done on all DRGs where differences
significant [ DRG 82,

~ere

140, 243, 296, 320, 336, 468 ].

Controlling for the number of discharges per DRG,
government hospitals were compared to nonprofit
hospitals on length of stay (note Table XVIII>.
Statistically significant differences on DRG 296, 320,
and 468 were discerned with government hospitals having
significantly higher lengths of stay in two DRGs only.
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TABLE XVIIIt

LENGTH OF STAY BY DRG
NONPROFIT

DRG

MEANS

F-SCORE

vs.

BIG.

GOVERNMENT

.

ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS
FOR INDEP.
CDVAR •
R-SQ.
GOVT.
NONPROF.

82

9.73

.03

NS

.10

-.03

.09

140

s.ss

2.47

NS

.09

.13

-.38

243

7.53

3.78

NS

.2:5

.37

-1.02

296

7.70

6.67

.01

.21

.77

2.11

320

7.97

s.so

<.OS

.20

.47

-1.29

336

7.17

1.87

NS

.07

.39

-1.97

468

1S.S7

:5.24

<.OS

.17

-2.02

s.ss

TABLE

XIX a

LENGTH OF STAY BY DRB
GOVERNMENT VB FORPROFIT

DRG

MEANS

F-BCORE

SIG.

ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS
FOR INDEP. lc COVAR.
GOVT.
FORPROF.
R-SCI.

82

e.os

4.1:5

.os

.14

-.66

2.16

140

~.oa

.24

NS

.03

-.02

.09

243

7.12

2.08

NS

.18

.24

-.79

296

8.21

4.43

<.O~

.19

-.S2

1. 70

320

7.6:5

3.44

NB

.13

.32

-1.04

336

7.?0

4.73

<.OS

.1S

.S3

-1.73

468

14.84

7.S4

<.01

.21

-2.2S

7.31

Signi~icant

296,
differences were present in DRG 82,

hospitals having longer
336, and 468 with government
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lengths of stay in three DRGs

<82, 296, 468>; note Table

XIX.
The forprofits compared to government hospitals
limit length of stay at statistically significant levels
on three DRGs <82, 296, 468).

This behavior can be

viewed as an effort to decrease costs, particularly when
reimbursement limits are in place.

If a hospital

consistently has their patients exceed allowable length
of stay under DRGs, costs per patient day are bound to
increase

<See 1985 data:

regression analysis reflect

average length of stay as a significant predictor

TABLE XX1

LENGTH OF STAY BY DRS
FORPRDFIT VS. NONPROFIT

DRG

MEANS

F-SCDRE

BIG.

ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS
FOR INDEP. lc COVAR.
R-SQ.
FORPROF.
NONPROF.

82

B.4S

7.:52

<.01

.16

-1.16

1.37

140

S.36

10.34

<.01

.19

-.29

.::ss

243

7.63

2.79

NB

• 11

-.22

.26

296

7.3:5

2.88

NS

.13

.4S

-.S3

320

8.21

1. 27

NB

.03

-.24

.29

336

7.93

1. 02

NB

.04

-.20

-.24

468

13.26

.98

NS

.1S

Sorrentino,

1985>.

nonprofit hospitals

.001

.001

The forprofits were compared to
<Table XX>.

Note that out of seven

DRGs, there were only significant differences in two
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diagnostic categories.

In comparison to the nonprofits,

the lengths of stay were significantly lower in the
forprofit hospitals on

DRG categories 82 and 140.

In general, though, there were thirteen

(13) DRGs

which showed no statistically significant differences.
Thus, with regard to length of stay by DRG, we fail to
find evidence in support of the property rights view.
Charges Per DRG.
DRGs

Note Table XXI.

On 13 out of 20

<65'l.>, charges were statistically different among

three hospital types.

These DRGs were:

DRG 15

<Transient Ischemic Attack>, DRG 89 (Simple Pneumonia
and Pleurisy, age over 69 with complications and
comorbidity>, DRG 127 <Heart Failure, Shock>, DRG 140
<Angina>, DRG 148 <Major Small and Large Bowel
Procedure, age over 69 with complications and
comorbidity), DRG 174 <Gastrointestinal Hemorrhage, age
over 69 with complications and comorbidity), DRG 182
<Esophageal, Gastrointestinal, Miscellaneous Digestive
Disease, age over 69 with complications and
comorbidity>, DRG 210 <Hip and Femur Procedure, except
major joint, age over 69 with complications and
comorbidity>, DRG 243

<Medical Back Problems>, DRG 296

<Nutritional and miscellaneous Metabolic Disorders, age
over 69 with complications and comorbidity>, DRG 320
<Kidney and U~inary Tract Infections; age over 69 with
complications and comorbidity>, DRG 336 <Transurethral
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TABLE

DRG

XXII

CHARGES BY DRG BV OWNERSHIP

GRAND
MEANS

NONPROF

14

7288

700~

6920

7640

.4S

15

3343

2984

2673

3&~3

4.16

82

6008

5872

6386

6007

88

6194

61SB

S9SB

89

784:5

7101

96

~129

122

CELL MEANS
aovT
FORPROF

F-SCORE

BIG.

R2

ne

.13

.os

.13

.12

ne

.09

6297

.OS

ne

.os

6777

8803

s.o~

.01

.36

5141

4283

S37B

1.98

na

.23

667~

6389

5944

7142

2.18

n•

.28

127

6022

5~6~

5295

6633

4.S~

<.01

.33

138

4188

38~1

4134

4489

1.53

na

.17

140

3730

3589

318S

4017

3.91

.os

.57

148

17252

15229

13363

20159

7.83

<.01

.40

174

5073

47S6

3857

5703

6.06

<.01

.::s~

182

3469

3136

3006

3893

3.98

.os

.22

210

11175

10368

8531

12672

?.sa

.01

.::sa

243

3SS1

3499

2S8S

39S6

10.24

.01

.52

294

4308

3928

4115

4691

1. 59

n•

.21

296

4699

3826

S187

S286

4.39

.01

.21

320

50!17

4872

3SS2

5677

7.51

.01

.37

336

5586

S159

3825

6488

10.83

.01

.43

468

12926

11689

16737

12801

3.05

.05

.36

Pr-ostatectomy;
and DRG 468

age over 69 with complications and comorbidity>,

<Unrelated Operating Room Procedure to a given
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Medical Diagnostic Category>.

TABLE XXIII

CHARBEB BV DRS
FORPROFIT vs SOYERNt1ENT
ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS
FOR INDEP. lc COVAR.
R-BQ. FORPROF. GOVT.

DRG

MEANS

15

3~75

4.34

.o~

.12

277

-901

89

8327

3.21

NS

.10

471

-1~32

127

6318

5.02

<.05

.lS

328

-1067

140

3821

7.32

.01

.19

196

-636

148

19~60

7.SS

<.01

.S1

1871

-6082

174

S269

8.33

<.01

.22

449

-1460

182

3684

3.17

NS

.02

200

-6S3

210

11698

8.9S

<.01

.28

1119

-3637

243

3633

14.19

<.01

.40

327

-1063

296

~263

.01

NB

.01

10

-32

320

S177

11.88

<.01

• 32

4BS

-1S87

336

S862

14.91

<.01

.34

637

-2071

468

13727

2.96

NS

• 11

-778

2S29

F-SCORE

BIG.

Property rights theory would predict that nonprofits and
government hospitals will demonstrate lower charges per DRG.
Forprofit hospitals attempting to maximize profits would have
higher charges per DRG.

To test for this, the forprofit

hospitals were compared to government hospitals on the DRGs
where initial comparisons showed statistical significance.
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At a glance <Table XXII>, the forprofit hospitals show
higher charges on 12 aut of 13 DRGs.
charges were statistically higher.

On 9 DRGs,
Comparing the

forprafits to the nonprafits <Table XXIII>,

the

forprofits had significantly higher charges on ten DRGs.

TABLE XXIII1

CHARGES BV DRG
FORPROFITS VB. NONPROFIT
ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS

DRG

MEANS

1S

FOR INDEP.
F-SCORE
S.24

~

FORPROF.

COVAR.

SIG.

R-SQ.

NONPROF.

<.OS

.10

398

-470

<.OS

.11

7SS

-928

89

8024

127

6143

S.07

<.OS

.10

140

3820

2.83

NS

.06

206

-244

148

17900

8.93

<. 01

• 44

2440

-2883

174

S2BO

4.43

<.OS

.11

360

-44S

182

3546

5.59

<.OS

.12

324

-383

210

11616

7.06

<.01

.14

1003

-11BS

243

3747

NS

.12

242

-286

296

4617

10.22

<.01

.23

7S7

-89S

320

S30B

3.74

<.OS

.12

401

-474

336

~879

8.49

<.01

.17

S46

-646

468

12291

.73

NS

.12

1025

-1212

-609

Forprofit hospital behavior was consistent with
profit maximization as reflected by higher charges.
There is evidence to suppor t

th 1· s

•

This is consistent
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with the expectation that charges in nonprofit and
government hospitals would be lower since they
receive tax exemptions and philantropic donations.
The results on Table XXIV below show that nonprofits

TABLE XXIVa

CHARGES BV DRG
NONPROFITB VS. GOVERNMENT

DRG

MEANS

1~

2901

89

7015

127

F-SCORE

SIG.

.71

ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS
FOR INDEP. • COVAR.
R-SQ. NONPROF.
GOVT.
73

-201

NS

.04

NS

.02

.17

NS

.02

66

-183

-142

140

3481

1.08

NS

.OS

99

-274

148

14731

.69

NS

.16

S19

-1429

174

4~08

1.87

NS

.06

246

-647

182

3101

.19

NS

.03

26

-72

210

9878

1.10

NS

.0~

476

-1308

243

32SS

4.81

<.OS

.23

221

-609

296

4189

3.67

NS

.18

3S4

10!58

320

4S20

6.07

<.OS

• 28

309

-8~1

336

4803

NS

.09

3SO

-962

468

1303S

<.OS

.18

-1361

3744

S.77

compared to government hospitals show statistically
higher charges in only two

<2> DRGs [DRG 243 and 320].

In all other DRGs, there was no statistical significance
of the lower charges in government hospitals in
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comparison to the nonprofits.
Reimbursements Per DRG.

The present reimbursement

system sets fixed prices for hospital services.
Table XXV.

Note

In the majority of the DRGs C70X>, the

findings indicate no significant differences.

The

differences were significant in six DRGs <30%>:

DRS 14

< Specific Cerebrovascular Disorders except for
Transient Ischemic Attack>, DRG 174 <Gastrointestinal
Hemorrhage, age over 69 with complications and
comorbidity>, DRG 210 <Hip and Femur Procedure, except
major joint, age over 69 with complications and
comorbidity>, DRG 243 <Medical Back Problems>, DRG 320
<Kidney and Urinary Tract Infections, age over 69 with
complications and comorbidity>, DRG 336 <Transurethral
Prostatectomy, age over 69 with complications and
comorbidity>.
According to the property rights theory, a
forprofit hospital would demonstrate higher
reimbursements to maximize return on investment.
Even though pricing is fixed, accurate classification of
patients by coding, thorough physician documentation of
all complications and associated procedures, allow
recouping the most reimbursement monies.
Noting Table XXV, forprofit hospitals show
statistically higher reimbursements in four DRGs
210, 320, 336).

C14,

Nonprofits were statistically higher in
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two DRGs (174, 320).

TABLE XXV

I

REIMBURSEMENTS BY DRG BV OWNERSHIP TYPE

GRAND

CELL

MEANS

DRG

MEAN

NDNPROF GOVT FORPROF

14

4336

4387

3778

4464

3.30

.OS

.37

1S

1969

1923

1869

2039

.91

n•

.21

82

3688

3768

3400

3709

2.34

n•

.43

SB

32S6

3129

30~4

3210

1. 02

n•

.20

89

3774

3S77

3203

4116

.83

n•

.oe

96

2467

251S

2260

2490

2.32

.43

122

4240

4254

3699

4394

1. 81

n•
n•

127

3330

3383

3059

3369

2.66

n•

.47

138

2877

2849

2721

2947

.ss

na

.21

140

2310

2363

2097

2330

2.93

n•

.46

148

8188

8232

7135

8474

1.83

n•

.30

174

2891

2979

2424

2963

s.oo

.01

.42

182

1865

1901

1692

1886

2.30

n•

.41

210

6565

6700

5033

6922

~.35

.01

.30

243

2332

2329

1889

2471

3.62

.os

.31

294

2491

2522

2299

2526

2.41

n•

.46

296

2887

2918

2692

2922

1.65

na

.43

320

2533

2611

2110

2596

6.10

<.01

.46

336

3035

3076

2321

3220

s.~s

.01

.36

468

6854

7043

66?6

6750

.41

n•

.20

F-SCORE

SIG.

.26

Government hospitals were consistently lowest in
reimbursements per DRG.

R2
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TABLE

XXVIa

REIMBURSEMENTS BV DRS

GOVERNMENT VB. FDRPROFJT

DRG

MEANS

F-SCORE

BIG.

ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS
FOR INDEP. & COVAR.
R-BQ.
FORPRDF. SOVT.

14

4303

3.64

NS

• 11

173

-S62

140

227S

2.63

NB

.09

~4

-177

174

2836

4.23

.OS

.12

130

-424

210

6477

7.69

<.01

.24

sos

-1640

243

2333

3.9S

.OS

.12

137

-447

320

2482

5.23

<.OS

.1B

111

-362

336

3008

7.~0

.01

.20

21S

-699

TABLE XXVIII

REIMBURSEMENTS BV DRG
FDRPROFIT VS. NONPROFIT

DRG

MEANS

F-SCCRE

BIG.

ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS
FOR INDEP. &c COVAR.
FORPROF. NONPROF.
R-SQ.

14

4429

.1S

NS

.01

12

-14

140

234S

.12

NS

.02

-23

-27

174

2970

.01

NS

.09

-46

S7

210

6820

.30

NS

.007

112

-132

243

240S

.79

NB

.02

64

-76

320

2603

.02

NS

.oo

7

.60

NS

.02

4S

336

31S4

-·
S3
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TABLE XXVI I I 1

REIMBURSEMENTS BY DRG

NONPROFIT VB. GOVERNMENT

DRG

MEANS

F-BCORE

BIG.

ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS
FOR INDEP •
COVAR.
R-SQ.
NONPROF. GOVT.

•

14

422~

3.08

NB

.13

1~4

-424

140

234:5

.12

NS

.02

27

-23

174

2926

4.13

.os

.14

1~2

-400

210

62SS

3.66

NS

.21

424

-1167

243

2211

4.~9

<.OS

.17

111

-30S

320

2478

4.91

<.0~

.19

123

-340

336

2973

3.19

NS

.12

18S

-S09

Fo~p~ofit

reimbu~sements

categories

hospitals had

signi~icantly

higher

than government hospitals on five DRG

<Table XXVI>.

In comparison to the

nonprofit hospitals, though, differences were not
significant at all
we~e

<Table XXVII>.

Nonprofit hospitals

compared to the government hospitals <Table

XXVIII>.

Government hospitals show lower

reimbursements, but these were statistically significant
in only three DRGs.
Analyzing for trends, note that where there are
differences in lengths of stay in seven DRGs <Bl,

140,

243, 320, 336, 468>, we find that six of these DRGs
(140, 243, 296, 320, 336, 468>

were significantly
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dif~erent

in charges as well.

Only in two of these DRGs

<320 and 336) were reimbursements statistically
different.
Thus, our findings showed that reimbursements per
DRG were higher in the forprofit

hospitals than both

nonprofit and government hospitals.

Although the

sophisticated classification of the DRGs is complicated,
and the amount reimbursed to the hospital should be the
same regardless of ownership status, there are factors
to consider which may account for differences.

As

indicated earlier, operational efficiencies, such as
ensuring detailed physician documentation and proper
coding in the medical records department, allow accurate
patient classification in the appropriate DRG
categories.

Again, we did not find the difference we

expected according to the property rights theory.
Conclusion.

In the context of efficiency, the

evidence for property rights is mixed.

Hospitals

differed significantly on bad debts, manhours, and
charges per DRG.

In terms of occupancy rates, the study

findings showed both nonprofit and government hospitals
with higher occupancy rates.

However, we found

significant differences between nonprofits and
forprofits only.

Nonprofit hospital behavior here is

consistent with the output maximization rationale.

Our

analyses did not support the property rights argument in
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the forprofit hospitals.

Other possibilities which

might explain differences include variations in cases
treated in each hospital; the patients may stay longer

Our

such that occupancy rates show a high figure.

analyses on length of stay by DRG ruled this out.
Another possibility

is the factor associated with

physician affiliation with certain hospital ownership
types.

Early on, this study referred to the physician#s

cooperative hypothesis advanced by Pauly and Redisch
(1973>

for the nonprofit hospital.

The indirect

implication would be the economic interests of the
physician as far as being a

11

high admitter ...

As one

looks at the advantages of admitting to a certain
hospital as opposed to another,

the picture becomes

more obscure because the physicians are the primary
decision-makers in hospital admissions.

Their obvious

authority is needed, by the same token, to discharge a
patient.

Physician practice patterns in the three

ownership categories could affect occupancy rates.

This

factor is interesting but access to this type of
information is extremely limited.

Subsequent studies

should consider this measure in the future.
In relation to ancillary expenses, we found no

support for the property rights theory.

One o-f the

concerns regarding DRGs was that profit-seeking
hospitals will attempt to minimize the expenditures
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associated with delivery of care

by decreasing

utilization of ancillary services because reimbursement
of expenses is fixed.

Regardless of the amount of

ancillary services provided, the monies a hospital would
receive will be dependent on the amount allotted for
that particular DRG.

It is logical that a profit-

seeking hospital would minimize ancillary service
expenditures.

The ancillary expenses in the forprofit

hospital were lower.

The higher ancillary service

expenditures in the government hospitals, although not
statistically higher in our sample, could be attributed
to many factors, such as:
larger

( 1)

government hospitals are

<although comparisons have been controlled for

bed size);

<2> government hospitals have affiliating

medical and nursing schools, and as such, adherence to
standard treatment protocols requiring certain ancillary
services may be routine;

and

(3)

there was a higher

number of Medicaid patients for the government hospitals
in this study.
poorer.

Their health status could have been

They may have been sicker, as well.

In the

case of the forprofits, we know that they have fewer
Medicaid patients than government hospitals.

Thus,

these factors which affect variability in expenses for
ancillary services due to differences in utilization by
patient type need to be kept in mind. The analyses here
were not on ancillary expenses by DRG category

<These
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data were not available.).

Our multiple regression

analysis on ancillary expenses showed bed size, Medicare
days, and Medicaid days as significant predictors.
confirmed the first and third possibility.

This

In this

sample, there was one nonprofit hospital with an active
affiliation with a medical and nursing school.

This

study was limited in that the thorough investigation of
this aspect was not done.

Future studies should examine

this area closely.
What is surprising is the behavior of the
nonprofit hospitals, particularly in terms of bad debts,
charges and reimbursements.

Their behavior mimics that

of the forprofit hospitals.

This makes less clear the

distinction between nonprofit and forprofit hospitals.
In terms of operational efficiency, these analyses imply
that nonprofit hospital behavior approximates that of
the forprofits in certain ways.

This was evident

particularly when bad debts were examined.

When this is

related to the finding that the amount of uncompensated
care is a statistically significant predictor of bad
debts, the behavior of the nonprofit hospitals does seem
to be consistent with the expectation.
The evidence seen in this study on manhours per
patient day showed that both nonprofit and government
hospitals had higher hours than the forprofits.
in this study, it was noted that nonprofit and

Earlier
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government hospitals were larger

<in terms of bed size).

This study controlled +or this statistically.
It has also been mentioned that human resources are
required to staf+ more hospital beds.
on a

twenty-~our

As such, manpower

hour basis is shown as its highest

operational expenditure.

The rational response from a

profit-maximization standpoint would be to decrease
manhaurs per patient day.
By the same token, if one is to decrease the number
of manhours to decrease expenditures, one would also
decrease expenditures associated with salaries.

The

study results showed no significant difference among
nonpro+it, government, and forprofit hospitals.
Nonprofit and forprofit salaries were practically
identical; government hospitals were the least.
However, bear in mind that manhours per patient day in
both the government and nonprofit hospitals were higher
than the forprofits.

It is amazing to find the

nonprofits with higher manhours and yet, with pay
similar to the forprofits.
11

This can be construed as a

fringe benefit .. for the employees of the nonprofit and

government hospitals.

With higher manhours, workload

per FTE is lower than the forprofits.

In essence, this

strengthens the property rights position.
The concern for variability of cases treated in the
hospitals brought us to analyze ~or each o~ the twenty

127

DRGs, the length of stay, charges, and reimbursements.
On length of stay, the findings showed that there were
no significant dif+erences among hospitals on 65X of the
DRGs.

On examining each average length of stay per DRG

in the forprofit hospital, i t was consistently lower in
8 out of 20 DRGs <although not necessarily significant>.
Yet, this did not translate into lower charges per DRG.
The charges per DRG were significantly different
among the three hospital types on 65/. of the DRGs.
Consistently, charges per DRG in the forprofit hospital
were higher.

Nonprofit hospital charges were higher

than government hospitals but lower than forprofit
hospitals.
As can be expected, fixed reimbursement rule
effects are demonstrated in the study results.
majority of reimbursements
significantly different.

The

(70/.) per DRG were not
The higher reimbursement to

the forprofit hospitals on 12 out of 20 DRGs

(although

not significantly higher> shows us that there are ways
by which hospitals can, within a DRG category, recoup
the most amount of monies.

These creative strategies

make future analyses of hospital behavior challenging,
particularly when there are difficulties associated with
retrieval and access to most relevant data.
Let us reiterate, though, that there were a number
of cases in which property rights theory could predict
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differences that were not found.

These were in regard

to occupancy rates, ancillary expenses, salaries per
FTE, lengths of stay per DRG, and reimbursements per
DRG.

Nonprofit, government, and forprofit hospitals

were not significantly different in terms of salaries
per FTE.

In the majority of the DRGs, lengths of stay

and reimbursements were not significantly different.
The provision of health care in the nonprofit form
is encouraged through the tax incentives and on the
forprofit side by accrual of net revenues to
shareholders.

Several variables of efficiency were

explored to compare nonprofit, government, and forprofit
hospitals to obtain evidence in support of the property
rights theory.

Some mixed evidence supporting the

property rights theory has been presented.

However,

caution must be exercised in generalizing the findings
of this study.

Several questions remain unanswered.

Of

particular importance is the aspect of what purchasers
of health care services are willing to pay.

Private

insurance companies pay differently as opposed to
Medicare or Medicaid.

Although twenty DRGs were

investigated in this study across all hospital types in
an attempt to control for product differences, the
extent to which hospitals may shift costs of care among
different payers would be a crucial dimension for future
studies.
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If there is an economic orientation on the part of
nonprofits in the light of the present cost-containment
policies, to what extent do nonprofit hospitals fulfill
their social obligations?

The question lingers for all

other types of hospital ownership status, as well.
this context,

~urther

In

analysis was done to better

understand issues relating to equity.

EQUITY
Nonprofit, government, and forprofit are now
compared in the context of equity by analyzing data on
Medicare, Medicaid, and Uncompensated Care.
Medicare [Hypothesis ClJ.

Note Table XXIX which

shows statistically significant differences by ownership
status:

TABLE

XXIX1

MEDICARE DAYS BY OWNERSHIP

OWNERSHIP

MEAN

MEDIAN

NONPROFIT

54102

57752

GOVERNMENT

48804

~94~S

FORPROFIT

34S78

29891

GRAND MEAN

4::5932

F-BCORE

BIG.

<.01

Comparing nonprofits to the government hospitals, note
that the government hospitals had fewer Medicare days
by 5298.
XX X>.

This was not statistically significant

<Table
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TABLE XXXa

MEDICARE DAYS
AND VA

ANOVA

F-SCORE
NP
FP
NP

v•
v•
v•

BIG.

M-W
Big.

G

.23

NB

NS CNS*)

8

3.94

.o~

NS <NS*>

1~.S9

.01

.02

FP

Forprofits compared to government hospitals, the
government sector had more Medicare days by 14226.

ANOVA results show statistical significance at .05.
Nonprofits compared to forprofits were significantly
different,

19524.

with farprofits having fewer Medicare days by

This was statistically significant at .01.

Mann-

Whitney analysis confirm ANDVA results except for the
comparison between the forprofit and government
hospitals.

There was no significant difference in the

medians of the two hospitals.
Nonprofits have the highest mean number of
Medicare days.
ways:

(1)

This finding can be interpreted in three

Nonprofit hospitals give care to Medicare

patients from a fiduciary standpoint,
obligation to do so;
output maximization.

i.

e.

social

this behavior is consistent with
( 2>

Fewer mean Medicare days in

the forprofit hospitals in comparison to the nonprofit
hospital could be .. avoidance behavior~~ by this sector
because of DRG reimbursement for Medicare patients.
forprofit hospitals have been known to follow

The
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legislative events closely and consequently are able to
~eact

to impending reimbursement rules quicker than

nonprofits.

The limitations on reimbursement for

Medicare patients make this market less attactive to
profit-seeking hospitals.

<3>

Fewer mean Medicare days

in the government hospitals compared to nonprofits may
be due to physician practice patterns.

<Note that when

medians are examined, there is no significant
difference).

There could be preference or priority

given to the treatment of trauma, emergency cases, or
acute care rather than the chronic debilitation that
characterizes Medicare recipients who are 65 years and
over.
In the analysis on location,

i t was mentioned that

certain geographic areas were found to have higher
Medicare enrollees

<highest in Palm Beach>.

Looking

for further evidence to explain forprofit behavior, note
Table XXXI which shows no significant difference by
location in terms of Medicare days.

There are fewer

forprofit hospitals than government hospitals in Palm
Beach

<Note earlier, Table II showed hospital ownership

by location.>.

These findings show support of the

"avoidance behavior 11 by forprofits or on the government
side, the fiduciary obligation to meet the society's
needs

(output maximization>

sector do not thrive.

in areas where the private

This may also imply that the
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elderly simply live in older communities where hospitals
were established prior to the increase in the number of
forprofit hospitals.

TABLE XXXIt

MEDICARE DAYS BY LOCATION

LOCATION

MEAN

PALM BEACH

37308

BROWARD

4613.7

DADE

44980

BRAND MEAN

43932

Medicaid.

F-SCDRE

SIB.

2.74

NS

Note Table XXXII which indicates that

government hospitals provided the most under Medicaid
(16493).

Both

TABLE XXXIII

nonprofits and forpro+its provided less.

MEDICAID DAYS BV OWNERSHIP

OWNERSHIP

MEAN

MEDIAN

NONPROFIT

3469

3137

GOVERNMENT

16493

3802

FORPROFIT

2306

GRAND MEAN

4759

~~~~~~------

F-SCORE

SIG.

356

27.05

<.01
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Table XXXIII shows very interesting findings.
to the property rights theory,

According

we should expect to see

significantly more Medicaid days in nonprofit and

TABLE XXXIII•

MEDICAID DAYS
AN OVA
F-SCORE

ANOVA
BIG.

SIG.

M-W

NP v•

G

15.81

<.01

.05

FP

G

23.97

<.01

<.01

.93

NS

vs

NP vs

<FP>

<NB*>
((. 01*)

NS

government hospitals in comparison to forprofit
hospitals.

Further analyzing the data, no statistically

significant difference was found between nonprofits and
forprofits.

Analysis of variance results controlling

for bed size showed the F-score at .93.

Median levels

were compared and results were not significant.

very important to take note,
27 farprafit

days.

hospitals,

9

here,

It is

that in our sample of

hospitals showed zero Medicaid

There were 3 nonprofit hospitals out of 21 with

zero Medicaid days as well.

In both ANOVA and Mann-

Whitney analyses, forprofits compared to government
hospitals were statistically different at less than .01.
Theoretically, nonprofit behavior patterns should
reflect its fiduciary goals.

Comparing nonprofit

hospitals to government hospitals, nonprofit hospitals
had significantly fewer Medicaid days.

However~

when a
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large county hospital

is eliminated from the sample, the

level of signficance fails to reach the .05 level
(significance at .08>.

The provision of care to the

indigents by government hospitals as evidenced by the
number of Medicaid days was significantly higher than
forprofit hospitals.

The nonprofits, though, fail to

demonstrate statistically higher Medicaid days compared
to their forprofit counterpart.
Further analysis using multiple regression was
done.

With forprofit hospitals as the reference

category, we regress Medicaid days on three predictors:
bed size, nonprofit hospitals, and government hospitals.
With R square at 60.1/., we found t-ratios 7.07, -1.08,
and 2.16 respectively.
was removed.

One government hospital outlier

The R square is lowered to 34.1/. and t-

ratios were 3.98, -.36, 2.17 respectively.
The preceding analysis reaffirms our conclusion
that government hospitals have significantly higher
Medicaid days.

The negative t-ratios for the nonprofit

hospitals indicate that Medicaid days in this sector
are less but are not statistically significant.
Our earlier analysis an bad debts showed that
nonprofits were similar to forprofits.

Let us examine

this in the light of Medicare and Medicaid.

Is there

reason to believe that the provision of care to Medicare
and Medicaid patients might be related to bad debts.

We
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regress bad debts on five predictors (nonprofit,
government, bed size, Medicare, and Medicaid days>.
R square is 47.57..

The

Only government hospitals show a

statistically significant t-ratio

<4.44>.

Here, we fail

to find evidence linking the amount of bad debts to
Medicare and Medicaid days.

However, one might suspect

that differences in Medicare days and Medicaid days
affect occupancy rates.
five predictors

(nonprofit, government, beds, Medicare

days, and Medicaid days>.
1.80,

We regress occupancy rates on

T-ratios were revealing at

1.55, -3.85, 4.82, and 3.93 respectively.

square was 43.9/..

R

This finding could help explain the

lower occupancy rates in the forprofit hospitals.
Uncompensated Care.

The analyses of the percentage

of uncompensated care provided by nonprofit, government,
and forprofit hospitals show statistically significant
differences at less than .01
that

<Table XXXIV>.

It showed

the government hospitals provided the highest

TABLE XXXIV1

UNCOMPENSATED CARE

OWNERSHIP

MEAN

MEDIAN

NONPROFIT

.97

.70

~-4~

~.60

.17

.oo

GOVERNMENT
FORPROFIT
BRAND MEAN

1.18

F-SCORE

s1a.

63.76

<.01

amount of uncompensated care and forprofit provided the
least, followed closely by the nonprofits.

To
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determine whether or not the difference between
nonprofits and for-profits was significant, both
hospitals were compared.

TABLE XXXVt

NP

FP
NP

Table XXXV shows the ..-esults.

UNCOMPENSATED CARE

v• G
v• a
v• FP

ANOVA
F-SCORE

AND VA
BIG.

M-W
SIG.

21.~:5

<.01

NS

39.29

<.01

(.01

10.~3

<.01

<.01

The findings are significant.

<NB•>
((.01*)

Nonprofit hospitals

provided significantly more uncompensated care in
compa..-ison to the forprofit hospitals.

However,

differences between government and nonprofit hospitals
were not significant. The finding for government
hospitals is consistent with our expectation that these
hospitals will show evidence of maximizing
society.

services to

The forprofit hospital showed significantly

less uncompensated care in comparison to both nonprofit
and government hospitals.

This is consistent with our

expectation that forprofit hospitals are profitmaximizers and will avoid p..-oviding services for which
financing is not available.
Conclusion.

The supporting evidence for property

rights and subsequent behavior among forprofit and
government hospitals is clear.

The Medicare days for
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nonprofit hospitals were more than forprofit hospitals.
In terms of Medicaid days, the government hospitals had
the most compared to both nonprofits and forprofits.

In

terms of uncompensated care, the government hospitals,
again, provided the most.
Farprofits seek to maximize profits by limiting
Medicare, Medicaid, and uncompensated Care.

To the

contrary, the government hospitals showed evidence of
maximizing services.

However, the nonprofits' behavior

patterns are somewhat similar to the forprofits with
regard to Medicaid.

This is not consistent with the

property rights theory.

Our current knowledge of

nonprofits is that they have a historical mission to
serve a charitable purpose, to serve the poor, and
render a proportionate share of health services for free
or without compensation.

In fact these were partly the

conditions for the financial assistance

(for

construction under the Hill-Burton Act> given to
nonprofits.

An analysis of hospital financial

characteristics Florida indicates that nonprofit
hospitals provided a disproportionate amount of charity
and uncompensated care at 32.5'l. compared to government
hospitals at 61.8%.
<HCCB,

1984>.

Forprofits provided a minute 5.7%

By virtue of the tax-exempt status of the

nonprofits, the natu~al extension of this would be the
social purposes which must be served.
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If nonprofits are exempt from both property and
income taxesy the expectation is that appropriate
amounts of needed services are given.

In this sample,

we find that the number of Medicaid days given by
nonprofits is not significantly different from the
~orprofits.

A thought-provoking question is: do

nonprofits provide services to Medicaid patients
commensurate with their tax-exemption benefits?
unfortunately,

is not easily answered.

This,

Empirical data

on taxes needed to make valid comparisons are not
readily available or accessible.
tax year 1983 as an

example~

However, if we use the

the total

revenues for

community nonprofit hospitals in Florida was $89,462,795
and total expenses were $85,637,108

CHCCB,

income, thus, amounts to $3,825,787.

1984).

Their

If taxes were

applied at a rate which invester-owned hospitals pay
(24.1'l.>,

federal

taxes for which nonprofits were

exempted would be close to $lmillion.

This does not

include property tax exemptions.

When patterns such as

the one seen in this study occur,

justification for tax-

exemptions becomes difficult.

In essence tax exemption

is taxpayer subsidy of the hospital.

Serious inquiry

needs to be directed towards what is the proper role of
the nonprofit hospital

in addressing the needs of the

community where they are located.
landmark case of Utah v.

Note that the

Intermountain Health Care,

Inc.

139
in 1985 underscored the role of local governments in
evaluating the extent to which expectations are met and
to respond appropriately.
By the same token,

what are the legal and moral

obligations o+ the forprofit hospitals?

From this

vantage point, the fact that forprofit hospitals pay
income taxes could be seen as discharging their duties
accordingly.

Therefore, they do not have to provide

care to those who are unable to pay.

For the individual

who is sick and in need of care, with nowhere else to
go, this is hardly reassuring.

When hospitals turn away

sick patients because they do not have insurance,
serious jeopardy of life can occur.

When this happens,

the dollar value attached to measures of taxes,
uncompensated care, and so on become irrelevant.
This conflict can hardly be resolved.

Obtaining

empirical evidence in this regard will not be easy in
comparing the benefits of tax-paying hospitals as
opposed to tax-exempt hospitals who serve charitable
purposes.

As demonstrated in this study,

i t is

difficult to assume that nonprofits do in fact serve the
purposes for which they have been intended.

The number

of Medicaid days provided by the nonprofit hosptals in
this study do not significantly differ from the
forp~ofit

hospital.

Their charges per DRG do not

approximate that of the government hospitals;

and the
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amounts they were reimbursed are higher than that given
to the government hospitals.
The government hospitals in this study show
evidence along the lines of discharging their fiduciary
responsibilities.

Their behavior is consistent with

output maximization, particularly with regards to
Medicaid patients.

The forprofit hospital behavior in

this study demonstrates consistency with the property
rights argument that the rights to residual profit for
this sector means less provision of care to Medicaid
patients and less uncompensated care.
The final
of care.

stage of our analyses deal with quality

The fallowing pages will present the results

of the analyses.

Qu•lity of

C•~•

Hospital ownership status and quality of care have
been discussed in various studies <Chapters II and III>.
The property rights theory would predict that nonprofit
and government hospitals may provide a better quality of
care than forprofit hospitals.

In theory, the quality

of care in the government and nonprofit hospital

level that meets budget constraints.

is at a

The forprofit

hospitals, as profit maximizers, need to maintain their
patient patronage.

The quality of care in these

hospitals, hence, would be at a level where profits are
maximized and expenses minimized.

Additionally, all
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three hospital types are subject to rules and
regulations affecting the delivery of health care.
Therefore, we examine for differences among
nonprofit, government, and forprofit hospitals in this
regard.
Death Rates Per DRG [Hypothesis DlJ.

The index of

quality used in this analysis is death rates per DRG.
Table XXXVI shows twenty DRGs.

Note that not in any one

DRG was there a statistically significant difference.
Mortality rate is a general measure of quality.
However,

the selection of this sample for this study

identified hospitals which are accredited by the JCAH.
Length of stay and manhours per patient day are likewise
considered as indicators of quality.

For this

study, though, they were used as indices of efficiency.
In practice, death rates remain a gross outcome measure
of quality.
It was pointed out that the rationale for looking
at death rates on twenty DRGs for the different
ownership sectors was that organizational behavior may
vary because of this cost-containment incentive.
Specifically, that the forprofit sector's profitmaximizing behavior might be reflected in higher
mortality rates far this sector.
was evident.

No support for this
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TABLE XXXVII

PERCENT OF DEATHS BY DRG BY OWNERSHIP TYPE

DRG

GRAND
MEAN

NONPROF

CELL MEANS
GOVT FORPROF

14

1S.44

13.07

20.13

16.00

1. 99

1~

.9~

.79

-~~

1.21

.81

82

17.8~

17.34

18.22

18.16

.01

4.09

~.08

F-SCORE

SIB. R2

n•

.10

.29

n•

.09

89

9.87

7.67

11.98

11.99

2.64

n•

.13

96

1.21

1.03

1.09

1.09

.14

n•

.03

n•

.09

ns

.13

ns

.17

122

0

127

8.38

7.76

10.83

8.13

1.21

138

1.94

1.84

1.42

2.19

.28

140

.34

.~4

.42

.14

2.37
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6.78

4.22

11.84

7.39

174

4.68

4.87

3.60

4.8~

.19

182

1.09

1.04

1. 28

1. 07

.10

ns

.06

210

2.94

3.36

2.18

2.82

2.61

ns

.03

243

.26

.46

.17

.1~

.~1

ns

.04

294

2.6~

1.43

~.18

2.89

2.34

ns

.09

296

6.66

~.44

9. 11

6. 93

1. 41

320

2.69

2.88

3.26

2.3~

.2~

n•

.13

336

.6~

.47

.41

.90

.39

ns

.02

468

8.9~

9.07

18.09

6.04

2. 13

ns

.09

0

0

Conclusion.

0

0

Numerous concerns have been raised

when DRGs came into effect with regards to the risks
posed an the care of the patient when limits are imposed

143
on length of stay and limitations on amounts of money
reimbursed to hospitals for care delivered.

One of them

was that hospitals may discharge patients prematurely
and cause quality of care to decline.

Using death rates

as an outcome indicator, no statistically significant
difference was found among the three hospital types on
twenty DRGs.
The intended outcome of DRGs was to increase
competition among hospitals for patients and decrease
length of stay, thereby ultimately controlling costs of
health care.

With the expanding presence of forprofit

institutions, there is substantial concern regarding the
pursuit of profits and quality care in the face of
decreasing reimbursement monies.

The findings in this

study lend some reassurance that there is a minimum
level of quality addressed by all three hospital
ownership types.

This is with respect to death rates.

The author, as with other investigators in the field,
would rather have the ideal way of measuring quality.
This would be in terms of quality of life after
discharge from the hospital, case-specific, with
stratified sampling.
To date, very little i s known about the
relationships of organizational mission and patient care
outcomes.

This is not surprising.

This author is

fortunate to have seen health care systems in the
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Philippinesy Australia 9 and in the last thirteen years
in the United States, specifically in Florida.
Comparatively, this society has increasingly relied upon
the judicial system to resolve many

o~

its

con~licts

--

from child custody 9 visitation rights, who should have
prayer in schools and the like.
hospital setting.

No different is the

The increasing malpractice rates and

withdrawal of the two largest companies from
underwriting malpractice insurance
Florida lend credence to this.

~or

physicians in

Huge malpractice awards

to patients have been contested by hospitals and
physicians.

The lawyers have successfully blocked

legislation in capping monetary awards.
logical

that

i~

It would seem

the care given by a hospital or a

physician reflects

11

quality, .. malpractice suits will be

less likely in these hospitals.

A recent Florida

statute required reporting of cases within 72 hours of
11

Serious adverse events 11 via the hospital Risk

Management Program.

Clearly, all these indicate that

problems remain regarding quality of care.
The difficulties associated with studying quality
of care at the micro level spring from a

protectionist

attitude on the part of hospitals, physicians, and their
personnel under threat of losing their jobs should they
11

blow the whistle ...

will

It is unlikely that information

be accessible to the point where valid studies can
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be made.

An even greater problem is that the meaning of

quality, and how a patient, a physician 9 and a lawyer
perceives i t would differ.
The following chapter will present a summary of the
findings,

its generalizability in the light of the study

limitations,

its utility from a practical and

theoretical standpoint, and present a modification to
the original analytical framework to be considered in
future research.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Summary
There were 56 JCAH accredited hospitals offering
acute care, general services in this study.

The

framework for analysis described the relationships
to be examined.

Several hypotheses regarding hospital

behavior were proposed.

The results were presented,

discussed, and conclusions drawn.
presented

<next page>.

Table XXXVII is

For simplicity, the table does

nat include the analyses for location and length

o~

stay, charges, reimbursements, and death rates on twenty
DRG

catego~ies.

There were institutional variables which were
explored.

Bed size was higher in nonprofit hospitals in

comparison to forprofit hospitals.

Population density

plays a role in the preference for location by the
forprofit sector.
As indicators of efficiency, occupancy rates,
ancillary service expenses, bad debts, manhours per
patient day, salaries per FTE, length of stay per DRG,
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charges per DRG, and reimbursements per DRG were used.
Some empirical support for the property rights theory
was obtained.

TABLE

On thr•• indicators out of eight

XXXVIII

VARIABLE

I

SUMMARY TABLE

NP

v•

FP

1

NP

v•

a

I

HS
NB

BEDS

OCCUPANCY

.OS
.OS2

HS
NB

.OJ

<.01

ANCILLARY

<.OS

NS

HS

.01

BAD DEBTS

NS

<.01

FP

v•

<NS>

HS
NS

<NS>

<.OS
NS

<.01

MANHOURS

<.01

<.01

SALARIES

HS
NS

HS
NS

<NS>

NS

MEDICARE

.01.
<.02

HS
NS

CNS)

UNCOMP. CARE
[

It•lics:

[

Bold:

[

(

) :

NS

<.OJ

<.01

<.01

NS

<<.01)

.OJ

CNS>

MEDICAID

CNB>

<.OJ
<<.01)

HS

(.01.

<.O~S>

<.01

<NB)

NS

<.OS

<NS>

(.05

<.01

HS

a

<<.01)

HS
<NS>

.05
NS

CNB>

<.OJ
<.OS)

<.01

<NS>

<.01

<<.01)

<.01
<<.01)

ANOVA analysis controlling for Beds, Loc.J
Mann-Whitney Tests J
Mann-Whitney Test excluding 1 government
hospital outlier with over 900 beds J

(bad debts, manhours per patient day, and charges per
DRG>, statistically significant differences were found.
There were five indicators

(occupancy rates, ancillary
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expenses, salaries per FTE, length of stay per DRG, and
reimbursement per DRG>
property rights theory.

which showed no support for the
In some ways, nonprofit

hospitals mimic their forprofit counterpart
bad debts>.

<in terms of

We can only speculate on reasons

~hy

we

failed to find support for the property rights theory on
five variables

(occupancy rates, ancillary expenses,

salaries per FTE, length of stay per DRG, and
reimbursement per DRG>.

Hospital occupancy rates are

affected by the health needs within a community.

Often

even if discounted rates are offered, this does not
produce a corresponding rise in hospital admissions.
Hospital personnel salaries are broad indicators and do
not take into account the possibility that bonuses,
stock options, and other fringe bene+its such as paid
car allowances, housing, and holiday trips might have
been provided in certain hospital ownership types.

The

length of stay per DRG and reimbursement per DRG
analyses show results that reflect the response of
hospitals to cost containment incentives.

If these two

variables were studied over time, one might observe a
correlation between changes in length of stay, the
retrospective reimbursement system, and the prospective
payment system.
In the context of equity, Medicare days, Medicaid
days, and the amount of uncompensated care provided by
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nonpro~it,

government, and forprofit hospitals were

compared.

The study findings were consistent with the

property rights theory.

Di~ferences

among the three

hospitals on these variables were found to be
significant.

The implications of these differences were

discussed in the earlier chapter.

More Medicare days in

the nonprofit compared to the forprofit hospital
are consistent with output maximization.

Nonprofit and

forprofit hospitals show no statistically significant
difference in terms of Medicaid.

The

nonpro~it

hospital

behavior approximates that of the forprofit behavior in
this regard -- a finding that leads us to suspect that
there may be other factors other than restraint from
rights to residual profits that affect nonprofit
behavior.

These were discussed in Chapter II.

Forprofits provided significantly fewer Medicaid days
than the government hospitals.

This behavior is

consistent with the property rights expectation.

In

terms of uncompensated care, the forprofits were
significally lower and this evidence is also consistent
with the property rights theory.
The study revealed evidence on the relationship of
ancillary service expenses, Medicare days, and Medicaid
days.

Witp hospitals differing significantly on

Medicare and Medicaid days,

it is worth noting that

these account for 91.3/. of the variation in ancillary
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services.

This means that the changes in the target

patient population of hospital services according to
ownership categories <provision of services to Medicare
and Medicaid recipients versus private payers>

a definite area for future research.

The variation on

bad debts cannot be explained in terms of

in Medicare and Medicaid days.

would be

the variation

However, i t can be

explained by the amount of uncompensated care provided
by the hospital.
Some interesting questions remain unanswered.

Why

do nonprofits have similar Medicaid days with forprofit.
Government hospitals provided more in terms of Medicaid.
Nonprofit hospital bad debts are not significantly
different than the farprofits.

Does this mean that

nanprofits limit their bad debts by limiting the number
of

Medicaid days?

Are services provided in nonprofit

and forprafit hospitals sufficiently different so that
they can only admit certain types of patients?

These

interesting anomalies have not been fully investigated
in this study.

Certainly, these are avenues far

continued investigation.
In the context of quality of care, the death rates
for each

of the top twenty DRGs common to all hospitals

in the study were compared.
were found.

No significant differences

However, there are other outcome indicators

of quality which can be used in future evaluations.

The
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difficulty lies in framing the analyses and the
agreement on the definition of quality of care.
greater problem is access to information.

A

This gray

area remains even though the findings show that
hospitals, regardless of ownership status, maintain a
level of quality which does not compromise patient
lives.
This study explored questions in the extremely
complicated context of efficiency, equity, and quality
of care provided in the nonprofit, government, and
forprofit hospitals under DRGs.

The property right

arrangements were hypothesized to produce specific
outcomes in hospital behavior.

Government hospitals

were found to be consistent with the characteristics
expected with the present property right arrangement.
Nonprofit hospital behavior shows some evidence of
output maximization and
in certain ways.

mimics the forprofit hospital

This reiterates the need to study the

performance of this sector.

Forprofit hospital behavior

was consistent with profit maximization.
To conclude, the results of this study showed
mixed support for the property rights theory in the
context of efficiency, equity, and quality of ca~e.

The

behavior of the nonprofit hospitals can not be fully
·
d an d clea~ly
rema.l·ns an avenue far future
exp l a.1ne
•
researchers.

The fallowing discussion will focus on the
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potential utility

o~

the study

~indings

and suggestions

far future research.
Our study sample included hospitals in South
Florida.

There are both disadvantages and advantages.

The disadvantages include the small sample size which
limits generalizability.

This limited the number of

hospitals in each ownership category.
was limited to three counties.

The study area

Nonetheless, the fifty-

six hospitals in this study consisted of a majority for

South Florida.
area.

A total of eight hospitals are in this

Advantages in using the sample here include the

following.

The author is knowledgeable of the internal

operations of some hospitals in the area;

a complete

data set for the variables and DRS categories were
available;

and the use of South Florida eliminates area

variation with regard to population densities, health
status, and health care practice.

In particular, this

study could be done utilizing a similar model in other
parts of Florida.

It would be interesting to see if the

findings would support the property rights view.

With

this thought, let us follow this discussion with
suggestions for future research on property rights and
hospital behavior.
Having made the determination that DRG comparisons
were not particularly revealing, the author recommends
that future analyses be done on hospital

bu~~et

data
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This will allow inclusion of all ~he counties

only.

throughout the state of Flar!da.
several

years:

would be

An analysis for

1?857 1986 7 and in a few months 7

pos~ible.

With a

1987

larger sample, the study will

allow classification of hospitals by service type using
the model

by Berry

(1973>;

comparisons of different

counties throughout the state;
types,

and within ownership

subclassification of hospitals as forprofit chain

or non-chain and sa on.

In addition to this,

i t is

important to include classification of insurance payers
1.e.

private 1nsurance versus Medicare or Medicaid.
The use of death rates per DRG is a gross indicator

of quality.

Recent developments regarding the reporting

of serious incidents is now mandated by Florida statute.

It should be available from HRS for each hospital in
Florida.

Another alternative 1s to rev1ew the JCAH list

of recommendations for each hospital,
obtainable.

if this was

Having discussed some future research

considerations,

let us point out the utility of the

study.
From a

practical

standpoint, the knowledge we now

have regarding the behavior of hospitals in South
Florida may help us identify what incentives produce
specific outcomes.

Local health administrators involved

in shaping the structure of this community's health care
system might consider the specific issues relating to
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the provision of care to Medicaid patients.
Particularly important is the fact that if there are
community health needs which are nat being addressed,
i t would

be wise to consider to what extent the

forprofit and nonprofit sectors could be utilized to
meet these needs.
From a theoretical standpoint, we found some
evidence in support of the property rights theory.

We

focused on rights to residual profits in the forprofit
sector and maximizing services to society subject to
budget constraints in the nonprofit and government
sector as the fundamental bases for the distinction in
hospital behavior.

The government and forprofit

hospital behavior appear consistent with the theoretical
expectations.

The nonprofit hospitals, though, behave

in certain ways like the forprofit hospital.

It is

important to reiterate, here, that nonprofit hospitals
are not restrained from making profits.

It is only the

restraint on the accrual of profits to its governing
body that is specifically delineated.

In fact,

voluntary hospital associations have separate
corporations that handle investments for their nonprofit
hospital members.

We can only speculate what kind of

ramifications this will have on the internal operations
of the nonprofit hospital.

The evidence in this study

leads the author to believe that property rights theory
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can not be used to fully explain why this sector mimics
the forprofits in certain respects.

We might consider a

modification to our original framework for analysis.
Let us think of property rights along a continuum.
Over time,

incentives change.

The true nonprofit

hospitals many years ago were run by religious orders
and cared for those who need their service with little
or no compensation.

As incentives were created to

encourage production of services to specific groups
<such as children, pregnant women, elderly, indigents>,
we will find the inception of nonprofit organizations
geared towards this.

This author proposes that there

are hospitals which are hybrid nonprofit firms falling
somewhere along the property rights continuum.

These

hybrid organizations might be organized under the
leadership of individuals who may have a variety of
motivations:

economic interests, prestige, achievement,

self-actualization, etc.

Some of these leaders may be

doctors or consumer groups.

Depending on haw much

control over the decision-making process the governing
body has, the position of this nonprofit organization
changes along this continuum.

To investigate this

possibility, this author proposes the following measures
as indicators of efficiency:
margins, and

<2>

(1)

total and operating

non-operating revenue.

The operating

margin will show the excess revenues generated primarily
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from patient charges before taxes and the total margin
will show excess revenues generated
after taxes.

~rom

all sources

The non-operating revenue will

unrestricted income from

endo~ment

include

funds, retail

operation revenue, unrestricted gifts, or gain from the
sale of hospital properties.

The equity measures should

include the Medicare days, Medicaid days, and private or
charge based patient days.

Active participation of

hospitals in teaching and research should also be used
as measures of equity.

Quality measures should include

the number of serious incident reports, malpractice
suits, and the number of recommendations by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.

The

confounding variables to be considered in this analysis
should include the following:
services, hospital

bed size, types of

location, hospital age, health

policies, span of control/authority, and type of
leadership.
Ideally, true nonprofits and forprofits stand
completely on opposite sides of the continuum.

However,

because hospitals do nat exist in a vacuum, various
forces in the environment impact on their operations.
This means that property rights research remains an
ongoing process of veri+icatian.
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